I’m trying to work on shticks, but my blogging time has been getting filled up with halakhic questions. And yes, Torah takes priority over Purim shticks.

Today is the Fast of Esther, which is observed a few days earlier than usual because of Shabbat. Around fast days, Rabbis constantly get asked what time the fast ends. When I give my answer, I usually hear the follow-up question, “Why are you 30 minutes (or more) earlier than everyone else?”
In Ta’anit 12a R. Hisda says that any fast which doesn’t last until sunset is not considered a fast. Logically then, a fast that does end at sunset is considered a fast, and sunset is therefore the minimal time for ending fast.

Rosh (Ta’anit 1:12) explains that sunset here doesn’t mean the beginning of sunset, but rather the end of sunset – called tzeit ha-kochavim the halakhic definition of nightfall. However, Rosh doesn’t provide any reason for this stringency.

Tosafot (Avoda Zara 34a s.v. Mit’anin L’shaot, Zevachim 56a s.v. Minayin L’dam, Menachot 20b s.v. Nifsal B’Shekiat) admit that the gemara in Ta’anit does mean the beginning of sunset, since elsewhere “sunset” means the beginning of sunset, but the practice developed to be stricter and to wait until nightfall. Sefer Kolbo (61) cites the Rif¹ as saying that many people end their fast immediately at sunset, following the gemara in Ta’anit. Despite this, Sefer Kolbo follows the custom of the Tosafot on the grounds that we are not experts in determining the conclusion of sunset, and is therefore strict to wait until nightfall.² Finally, Tur (Orach Hayim 562) and Beit Yosef (Orach Hayim 562:6) both define this instance of “sunset” as “nightfall”

The Vilna Gaon (OH 562:1) references Pesahim 54b where there is a debate as to whether fast of the 9th of Av ends at sunset, implying that it is certainly permitted on every other fast day. I have been told from several that the Vilna Gaon does rule the fast ends at sunset, but I have not seen the source inside.³
R. Ovadia Yosef acknowledges the inconsistent definitions of “sunset” as either referring to the beginning or end of sunset (Yehaveh Da’at 5:22) . He concludes that the generally accepted custom is to wait until nightfall, but those who wish to end earlier have on whom to rely (Yabia Omer 6 O.H. 31).

My sense is that the Bavli clearly defines a fast ending at sunset, not at nightfall. This is the most consistent reading of the Talmud; even Tosafot agree with this reading of the gemara in Ta’anit. Sometime between the Rif and Rosh, the custom changed and interpretations changed to match the custom.⁴ At any rate, the halakhic end for the fast is at sunset. The later stringency is not based on halakha, but on minhag (custom). This isn’t to say that minhagim could or should simply be ignored, but the talmud defines objective rules for how customs work within the halakhic system. Thus, the laws of fasting post-sunset are not inherent to the laws of fasting, but the laws of observing customs. At some point I’ll write more about that in detail, but until then see my shiur on minhagim and of course Rambam’s Introduction.

To find the exact times in your area, see the OU’s or kashrut.com’s zemanim calculators.

1. Kolbo doesn’t cite a source for this Rif, and a Bar Ilan search didn’t find it.
2. Rabbeinu Yerucham (Toldot Adam 18:1:163c), Tashbetz Katan (1), Sefer Yirei’im (274), Maharif (6), and a whole slew of others follow the stringency of Tosafot and Rosh.
3. Neither Bar Ilan nor the UC Library have been helpful.
4. I have no time to do a full History of Halakha report on this, but if you want to, I’d love to see what you find.

Before I get to the shticks this year, I want to write about the dangerous practice of drinking on Purim. Each year, some people overdo it and wind up sick, hospitalized, or worse. The problems are exacerbated by Rabbis who encourage and sometimes force students to drink regardless if the students have the alcohol tolerance or are of the legal drinking age.

On the other hand, the Talmud seemingly requires excessive drinking; in which case, even 13 year olds would be obligated. Lets begin with the relevant passage from Megillah 7b:

This is loosely translated as “Rava said: a man is obligated to get drunk on Purim until he does not know the difference between “cursed Haman” and “blessed Mordechai.” This of course, requires an immense degree of intoxication. Some major halakhic works simply cite this dictum without qualification (Rif 3b, Shulhan Aruch Orach Hayim 795:2). Consequently many take this statement at face value, and therefore drink and encourage others to get inebriated, under the assumption that they are fulfilling a rabbinic commandment.

I’ve found several sources on the web which deal with this issue in one way or another, but I’ve found most of them to be lacking in real analysis. What I will show here is that while this statement might be obligatory, it does not require the degree of drinking which is commonly practiced.

(For readability, I will be sacrificing some precision in translations).

Apparently enough Hillel people liked my presentation on Egalitarian Liturgy that they’ve asked me to speak again. In honor of Tu Bishvat I will be speaking this Friday night on “Judaism, Ethics & the Environment” or anything else that would go along with that.
Will post details afterwards.

Dei’ah veDibur has a nice summary of the Haredi communities recent struggles with the Israeli education ministry and the required “core” curriculum. In a nutshell, the Israeli government wants to force the Hareidi schools to teach secular subjects such as “science” and “English.” The government plans to link state funding with compliance to this core curriculum, such that a school which teaches 75% of the curriculum will only get 75% of its alloted funding. Naturally, the Haredi world is quite upset at this, and managed to delay this implementation for at least another year.
The Haredi community opposes any teaching of secular studies in any form. They blacklisted “hareidi” yeshivas which tempt the boys with secular knowledge, and as mentioned here a while back women may not even receive professional training. Instead, all Hareidi men and women should strive to “toil in Torah.”
But according to Shinui MK Ilan Shalgi , chairman of the Knesset Education Committee, “They want to keep them severed, ignorant and poor, under their authority and dependent on them . . . ”
So, how to we get these two to make up? I’d suggest teaching that which the Talmud explicitly permits and/or encourages. Keep in mind, the Tannaim and Amoraim were not “from the knitted-kippoh ranks.”
Instead of teaching English, teach Greek which is permitted for men (B. Sotah 49b) and perhaps encouraged for women.(Y. Peah 1:1 15c).
If the Hareidi community doesn’t just want to keep their client?le “under their authority,” then train them to become gedolim. That would mean learning 70 languages (though not neccesarilly English, although the context of the gemara would require it).(B. San 17a) Furthermore, R. Yohanan requires that members be “ba’alei keshafim.” So we can add to the curriculum comparative religion. Or perhaps alchemy.
Biology? Teach the guys how to do shehita and how to check for t’reifot. Physics? How to calculate the new moons. Even Ra’avad couldn’t do that. Art? Teach safrut. Seriously, I know someone who took YU’s safrut class to fulfill the art requirement. History? “Remember the days of old, consider the years of many generations.” (Devarim 32:7)
See – it’s all a matter of packaging the material. You can still teach all these things in the context of Torah – and better yet practical Torah.
Now about this serving in the army thing…

The Yeshiva part of YU’s student council (SOY) publishes an annual “Torah” journal called “Beis Yitzhack.” Each year, Roshei Yeshiva, rabbinic alumni, Kollel or rabbinical students, and some undergraduates submit Hebrew articles on a variety of topics. This year, Kollel Elyon member R. Daniel Stein published two articles which offended many readers and embarrassed YU’s Kollel.
Normally in order for BY to get such negative reaction, someone has to make a big deal out of it.¹ A few years ago, some students published a “mehqar” (academic talmud) -type piece in BY and attributed something to Ha-Gaon R. Shaul (GRAS”H) Lieberman.² Probably no one would have noticed it unless the authors themselves hadn’t pointed out to everyone that were able to publish this piece in the typically “traditional” BY.³
I’m not around YU this year, so I don’t know exactly what is currently happening between the walls of the Yeshiva. I do know that Protocols posted something about this edition, and consequently sparked a vicious flame war in the comments and a subsequent follow-up post. I’ve been told, The Forward got wind of this and will cover it soon.
Thanks to Avraham I managed to get copies of the offending articles.⁴ My reaction? Honestly, I didn’t like either article.⁵ Are they worthy of the extreme reaction they’re getting? That’s a different story, and a more complicated issue.
What gets published or rejected is ultimately up to the editorial staff of the BY. What are their standards? I have no idea. Assuming they accept everything submitted, BY would be ideologically “open,” but it would eventually have to publish articles which diminish its credibility. However, in order to reject submissions, BY would need some objective acceptable criteria, which would invariably alienate some if not all of its intended readership.
What about R. Stein’s responsibilities? He took positions, and defended them based on his (or other’s) interpretation of selected sources. Should he have not quoted controversial opinions?
Once an opinion is published, it’s part of the public record. If this opinion is actually Torah, then why should we be embarrassed? The sages of Israel did not hide anti-secular laws from the Romans.(B. Bava Qamma 38a) Or following the mentality of the yeshiva, if these “gedolim” are at a level in which we may not question them, then who are we to censor them? If you find that they have ridiculous opinions, then perhaps they are not as great as you would like to believe.
In one of his articles, R. Stein belittles a methodology employed by at least one of YU’s Roshei Yeshiva. If he gives himself the right to evaluate and criticize one of the Roshei Yeshiva, then certainly R. Stein should not be held to a higher standard and above criticism himself. R. Stein chose to put his position in print, and consequently opens himself to peer evaluation.
There are certain rules of discourse which are determined by “common sense” or basic civility. If R. Stein is wrong, prove it. Demonstrate how he misreads sources. Prove how his logic and conclusions are incorrect. Many of the commentors in Protocols didn’t even read the article and were relying on one person’s abridged translation. With no actual evidence, people hide behind “anonymous” screen names and feel free to hurl invectives at anyone who disagrees with them. This is less of a problem with Protocols than it is with the entirety of the web. Slashdot and Kuro5hin both depend on the community moderating itself such that the insightful get read over the trolls.
I’m not a fan of censorship, but on the other hand we can’t accept every single possible position as part of every discussion. For now, I’m just advocating accountability. Accountability for Roshei Yeshiva in terms of their own methodologies and how closely they follow Torah. Accountability for the critics to demonstrate why they disagree. And finally accountability for the “netizens” for their comments.
Don’t censor articles from BY, but make sure they’re well argued. Don’t hide issues of the BY, but RTFA and respond coherently. No one is above criticism, but no one deserves an intellectual lynching either.
If you really think you’re right, put your name on the line and defend your position. Don’t suppress others and don’t hide behind anonymity.
If YU wants to maintain any credibility, it has to stop hiding from controversies and civility.
It’s time to put up, or shut up.
Update: I “put up” my own review of R. Stein’s article.

1. The fact that it’s written in Hebrew probably has something to do with its readership around YU.
2. R. Lieberman taught at the Jewish Theological Seminary. Despite being a world class Talmid Haham, many in YU do not take him seriously simply because of his affiliation with the conservative movement. Other might reference his Tosefta Ki-fshuta, but for the most part he is ignored. In this case, authors sinned by attributing the hallowed honorific reserved for select sages.
3. The best analogy I can think of is a high school yearbook. Every year someone puts in a “hidden” message which normal people won’t see. Nothing happens until someone points it out to the administration at which point, people get banned from graduation, pages get ripped out, etc.
4. As per my arrangement, I will not distribute my copies under any circumstances. Don’t as me, don’t ask Avraham. Just buy the book.
5. I realized in my GNU Testament post, I took a “cheap shot” at Rushkoff in that I disparaged his book without providing the exact flaws. For this, I apologize. Since I will not go into detail about the article’s content, I am intentionally not elaborating here. I may blog about the specifics later.

This is the message board part of the Jewish Guitar Chords Archive. If you have comments, compliments, or requests, post them here. If you have your own submissions, send me an e-mail and I’ll add them to the archive as soon as I can.

Although the MAPPS program offers unparalleled academic freedom, the directors of my program require one particular survey class, “Perspectives in Social Science Analysis.” Over the 10 week quarter, Dr. John MacAloon and various other professors present 9 different perspectives with Dr. MacAloon presenting an overview and another scholar discussing contemporary applications of that perspective.

In week 8, we covered “Structuralism,”¹ and I was surprised to see the similarities between this perspective and ” lomdus” – specifically the Brisker Derekh. There are several decent summaries of Structuralism on the web and some more on one of its main advocates Claude Levi-Strauss.²

For those too lazy to click the links or God forbid do your own research, I’ll give you the short attention span summary.⁴ Levi-Strauss, an anthropologist, utilized aspects of linguistic theory to interpret social phenomenon beyond language.³ Linguists, like Saussure, distinguished between the words used in language and the effect, the symbol and the meaning, the langue and the parol’. How did they do this? After analyzing how speech works throughout all cultures, they realized that some phenomenon repeated themselves and they explained the different phenomenon through polar binary opposites.

Levi-Strauss applied this methodology to social phenomenon like myths. In his work The Structural Study of Myth, Levi-Strauss demonstrates that the Oedipus myth contains elements found in myths from other cultures. He identifies the patterns by breaking down the myth into atomic elements, and “re-structures” these elements into classifications. Once Levi-Strauss classifies these elements into categories, he then uses his categorization to compare the Oedipus myth with similar myths. Although the categories are arbitrary, Structuralists like to formulate categories in binary opposites. E.g. symbol and meaning, personal and communal, etc.

How is this like the Brisker Derekh? Unfortunately, there isn’t much directly written on the methodology of how to do “Brisk.”⁵ However, I picked up a few things from my numerous years in yeshiva, and I can say that the analytical methodology is similar – though perhaps not identical.

Like structuralists, Briskers tend to explain several sources and rulings though binary comparisons. Some popular ones are heftza (object) and gavra (person), shem (name) and halos (legal status), mitzvah hiyuvi (obligatory commandment) and mitzvah kiyyumi (fulfilling a commandment), or simply “qualitative” and “quantitative” differences. Although this might apply to other areas of “lomdus” I’ve noticed that Briskers tend toward the binary opposites more than others. Just about every shiur I can remember from Gush involved a two-way mahloket and tannaim, amoraim, rishonim, and achronim neatly fitting into one of two arbitrary abstract categories.

Some Briskers also apply this perspective to areas of Jewish Thought. R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, perhaps the most famous descendant of the “Brisker Rav” and his tradition. In “The Lonely Man of Faith, R. Soloveitchik contrasts the personalities and religious attitudres of “Adam One” and “Adam Two” from the creation narratives. Elsewhere, R. Soloveitchik’s rational “Halakhic Man” stands in opposition to the more emotional “Homo-Religiosus.” Again, his thought leads him to present theological and religious ideas through manufactured binary oppositions.

Methodologically, Briskers construct and categorize the concepts in ways similar to the structuralists. Specifically, they first remove the sugya from the original context of the gemara. The sugya becomes the unit of analysis as opposed to a chapter, or even a page of talmud. Consequently, Briskers will not concern themselves with literary analysis or even finding the correct version of the talmud,⁶ because the details are not as important as the structure or the concepts. Like structuralism, these concepts are arbitrary and subject to the whim of the scholar. Unlike structuralism, yeshivas have canonized the scholars i.e. the rabbis, and therefore artificial structures become sacred and part of the “tradition.”⁷

I am not surprised that the Brisker Derekh attracts so many followers, nor am I surprised at the criticisms. Structuralism can be useful, and often it may be the best method for explaining a particular data set. Critics, however, will note that as a standalone system – as an “ism” if you will – structuralism assumes and imposes too much on the data. Furthermore, in the social sciences critics will complain that structuralists remove the human participants from the analysis. Social interaction becomes a bloodless game of abstract categories with no attention to human emotions. Similarly, critics of the Brisker Derekh deride the lack of attention to detail of the sugya in its original context. Literary approaches and historical evidence may often contradict the structures imposed on the text of the talmud.

I am not going to speculate on who got what from whom. Levi-Strauss was born and raised Jewish, and it’s likely his background influenced his scholarship. I also don’t think I’m saying anything radical or new here, it’s just an interesting similarity I noticed in class. Take it as you will.

1. Unfortunately, the laptop was in limbo then, so I don’t have typed notes from the lectures.
2. Not to be confused with the guy who made jeans.
3. See Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology
4. I.e. don’t cite this description for anything useful.
5. When I was in Gush, a small book called “The Brisker Derekh” came out and it was pretty close to a “How To Brisk.” As I recall, most of the ramim and students dismissed the book as too simplistic, which was probably as good of an endorsement as it could get. At any rate, I can’t find a link to it on the web.
6. The standard “Vilna” edition is loaded with errors. See Dikdukei Soferim or the Lieberman Project for other versions of the Talmud Bavli – and manuscript work is ongoing. If this sounds too heretical for you, consider that a passage may appear in several places throughout rabbinic literature (Bavli, Yerushalmi, Tosefta, Mishna, Midrash Halakha…), but there will be significant changes in their presentation. See for example, Dr. Elman’s Authority and Tradition and many, many, other works.
7. For some ramifications in education, see Hakirah or Mehkar: The Religious Implications of an Historical Approach to Limmudei Kodesh by Rachel Furst and Mosheh Lichtenstein, “What Hath Brisk Wrought: The Brisker Derekh Revisited” Torah U-Madda Journal, volume 9, 1-18, 2000.