Halakhic Process 2 - Contracts with God Sources (PDF)

Halakhic Process 2 - Contracts with God Sources

The Halakhic Process 1 - Introduction Sources (PDF)

The Halakhic Process 1 - Introduction

Rabbinic Thought and Theology - What is Olam Haba / The World to Come? Sources (PDF)

Rabbinic Thought and Theology - What is Olam Haba / The World to Come?

Rabbinic Thought and Theology 1 - Introduction / Angels Sources (PDF)

Rabbinic Thought and Theology 1 - Introduction / Angels

But it is just the difference between the Pesach forever, where a sacrifice was to be brought, and our Pesach, which is the clear evidence of basic problems of Jewish existence in our times. Here I will permit myself to present this by relating an event, or, to be more exact, a discussion, in which I took part a few years ago.

This was a seminar organized by the IDF, a seminar for senior military officers, which was held in the intermediate days of Pesach in one of the major bases of the IDF, and I was invited to participate in it. The topic of the seminar was contained in its title: "Judaism, Jewish People and Jewish State," and this already tells one what the discussions were all about. The deliberations were very earnest; various viewpoints and opinions and approaches were presented, but all the participants treated the topic seriously, as something close to their hearts, even though they did so from various angles and with, different approaches.

I made note of the major and serious fact that a gap has been, created between those Jews who observe the mitzvot and those who: do not, a gap which is not only ideological, but is—even against their will—existential. Two Jews cannot dine at the same table if one—and only one—of them observes the laws of kashrut; and families which observe the mitzvot cannot intermarry with families which do not, because one of the two prospective spouses (either the male or the female) insists on the observance of the laws of nidda and tevila, whereas the other prospective spouse rejects the religious discipline of marital life. Nor can Jews who are all aware of their. being Jewish, and who know that their fellows are Jewish, work together in the same workplace—because of Shabbat. But the kitchen and the table, sex and marital life, and work, constitute the realities of human life; thus we see that we cannot live .our lives in common.

One of those taking part in the deliberations, a senior IDF officer, pointed to Pesach as a national heritage which we have in common. Even if we have different attitudes toward Pesach, we all observe the Seder, in one form or another, because we all are conscious of the history of the Jewish people, which started—either historically or symbolically—with the Pesach event, and which we all wish to continue. These words were said in total sincerity and with great emotion. To this, I answered him: Imagine that I was not invited here today, to this seminar in one of the IDF bases, but would instead have used the Pesach holiday to tour the country, and my wife and I would have been hiking right now. And let us say that today is a very hot chamsin day, and thirst and the heat bothered us, and we would have, by chance, come upon the settlement where you live, and we would have entered your farm. Do you know that today we could not even drink a cup of water in your home, because of the chametz in your dishes? You are the commander of my sons and grandsons in the army, and today I could not drink a cup of water in your home. Pesach today is not a common heritage for us, and, if anything, the festival expresses a deep rift between us.

The man responded to this with deep emotion: It is true that you have mentioned a fact which is frightening, and nevertheless—we have a common awareness of Pesach. After all, we all regard Pesach as the symbol of the beginning and the continuation of the history of the Jewish people, and we are all united in our desire and in our aim of being a continuing link in this historical chain.

I was forced to point out his error to him, even in regard to this awareness. I told him: I understand and can feel the sincerity in your words and the profound emotion contained within them. For you, Pesach is indeed a great symbol of the history of the Jewish people. But for my wife and myself, Pesach is not a symbol, but a reality. Pesach is not expressed in the fact that we, using certain symbols, in this form or that, remind ourselves of the beginning of the history of the Jewish people. The significance of Pesach for us lies in the fact that for seven days we actually live a different life than all the other weeks of the year; for before Pesach we, or to be more accurate, my wife, transforms the house in order to prepare it for this festival.

For you, Pesach is a sentimental matter, and I am not trying to belittle it: sentiments are of great importance. Nevertheless, for you it is only a sentimental matter, whereas for us, Pesach is an existential issue—an issue dealing with our existence in the present, on this day and at this hour—and not a remembrance of an event which may be historical, or again, may be legendary, of 3,500 years ago.
Pesach thus presents us with the most profound problem which confronts the Jewish people and Judaism today.

Introduction

The protracted divorce battle between Aharon Friedman and Tamar Epstein is the most publicized case of agunah in recent memory. An aggressive campaign led by the Organization for the Resolution of Agunot (ORA) capitalized on Mr. Friedman's relatively prominent status as a congressional aide for David Camp. The efforts of numerous online and personal protests eventually led to mainstream media coverage from outlets such as Fox News, The New York Times and Politico which called national attention to Mr. Friedman's refusal to grant his wife a halakhic divorce. As with virtually all cases of agunah, the recalcitrant party is vilified with public condemnations and communal pressure to acquiesce.¹ When the specific goal is obtaining the immediate divorce, it is a relatively simple matter to identify the party responsible for obstructing the process and to protest accordingly. Others, however, find fault with the halakhic system, and in a desire to change the status quo identify other sources of blame.

In a recent Forward blog post titled "On Agunah Issue, Pressure Rabbis, Not Rep" Dvora Myers argues that the plight of agunot is not only the fault of a recalcitrant husband, but of the Rabbis for creating the regulations in the first place.

However, if withholding a get constitutes abuse, if the husband is indeed brandishing a psychological weapon and threatening his wife with it, then the question that should be asked: How did the gun get into his hand?

The answer is clear: It was put there by Jewish law, the rabbis who formulated it, and the rabbis who refuse to amend it.

Myers' understanding of Jewish law is informed by Blu Greenberg's famous dictum, "where there's a rabbinic will, there's a halakhic way," thus placing the burden of agunot squarely with the Rabbis. Ultimately Myers concludes,

If maintaining a nearly thousand-year-old ruling is more important than offering women equality within the religion, I would at least like to see one of these rabbis condemning Friedman admit as much. It would be refreshingly honest to hear one of them say something like, "When faced with the choice of preserving tradition and promoting justice and equality that would give women the freedom to divorce, we choose the former."

Most Orthodox Jews would agree that adhering to a thousand year old ruling is in fact more important than fulfilling the prevailing ethic of the day. This is due to a fundamentally different approach to Jewish law, one which assumes that halakhah is ultimately a representation of Divine Will. In this case it would be strict adherence to the biblical laws of divorce in Deut. 24:1-1 and the capital offense for adultery in Lev. 20:10. It is important to consider that this approach to halakhah is shared by the agunot themselves, who while having the free will to ignore Jewish law and remarry as they wish, are committed first and foremost to keeping halakhah despite the immense challenges it presents.² Thus, when a Rabbi adheres to Jewish law, even if it is unpopular, inconvinient, or even difficult for him to do so, he is not being an obstinate misogynist, but rather fulfilling his duty as a Rabbi.

But while it is misguided to blame Rabbis for following halakhah, it is completely legitimate to hold Rabbis accountable to the very halakhah which they espouse. Unfortunately, the Orthodox Rabbinate has not always lived up to their own ideals even when the lives agunot were at stake.

Denominational Politics

As stated earlier, it is reasonable if not expected for Orthodox Rabbis to prioritize adherence Jewish law over placating emotions or more subjective and capricious notions of ethics. In this respect, the "tradition" for which Myers finds little use is the fulfillment of Divine Will, which for a believing Jew is not an empty thing. But the "tradition" of halakhah is often equated with the "tradition" of Jewish culture such that communal practices or sociological identification may be just as if not more important than halakhah.

In 1954, the Rabbinical Assembly of Conservative Judaism formally discussed what is now known as the "Lieberman Clause," named after its primary author Rabbi Saul Lieberman. This clause was an additional paragraph to the traditional ketubah (Jewish marriage document), the text of which, as introduced in 1954 is as follows:

And in solemn assent to their mutual responsibilities and love, the Bridegroom and Bride have declared: As evidence of our desire to enable each other to live in accordance with the Jewish law of marriage throughout our lifetime, we, the Bride and Bridegroom, attach our signatures to the Ketubah, and hereby agree to recognize the Beth Din of the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, or its duly appointed representatives, as having authority to counsel us in light of the Jewish Tradition which requires husband and wife to give each other complete love and devotion, and to summon either party at the request of the other, in order to enable the party so requesting to live in accordance with the standards of the Jewish law of marriage throughout his or her lifetime. We authorize the Beth Din to impose such terms of compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond to its summons or to carry out its decision.

Thus, were a husband were to refuse to give a get to his wife, the wife would then appeal her case to the Rabbinical Assembly's Beit Din (religious court) who would then direct the husband to acquiesce. Should the husband continue to refuse, the Beit Din would have the authority to assess financial penalties until the husband relents. Assuming this clause would be enforceable in civil court (which seemed to be taken as a given at the time), then the secular courts could effectively compel the husband to "do what the Jewish court has instructed" (B. Gittin 88b), thereby disincentivising prolonged recalcitrance.

The Orthodox Rabbinate rejected the halakhic validity of the Lieberman Clause outright, though few would bother offering formal rebuttals. One notable exception was Rabbi Norman Lamm who even acknowledged the intellectual obligation of Orthodox Rabbis to justify their opposition.³ Rabbi Lamm's argument consisted of two main objections. The first contested the halakhic legitimacy of any Conservative Beit Din, stating

"How can Orthodox Jews - or, for that matter any intellectually honest person - be expected to recognize the authority of an ecclesiastical court which denies (or, at the very least, seriously questions) the origin and hence the authenticity of the very Halakhah in whose name it presumes to speak and whose tenets it seeks to interpret?" (Lamm, 1959:94)⁴

Secondly, by including the threat of financial penalties, the Lieberman Clause employed an "asmakhta" - a contractual condition which, by virtue of its particular uncertainty, would render the acquisition invalid.⁵ Thus the Orthodox rejected the Lieberman Clause and would not publicly endorse a significant standardized halakhic alternative for nearly forty years.⁶

In 1994, Rabbi Mordechai Willig drafted the "Halakhic Prenup," which is currently touted as "the single most promising solution to the agunah crisis." This prenuptial agreement, is effectively an agreement of binding arbitration to a designated Beit Din (PDF). In this legal document, the couple agrees to refer divorce disputes to the predetermined Beit Din with the acknowledgement that the Beit Din may impose financial penalties on either party. By using the legalistic mechanism of binding arbitration, any decision by the Beit Din regarding monetary judgments would then be upheld by the civil courts. While there have been similar strategies as employed on an individual or limited communal basis (Levmore, 2009), the Halakhic Prenup is the first major attempt at promoting a standardized solution throughout Orthodox Judaism. ⁷

The Halakhic Prenup has been endorsed by several prominent Orthodox rabbis, but the similarities between the Halakhic Prenup and the universally rejected Lieberman Clause are striking. Consider the following chart which includes direct citations from both documents:

Even assuming the differences between the Lieberman Clause and the Halakhic Prenup are halakhically significant, the actual differences between them are trivial to impliment. It does not require a Torah Sage to suggest substituting a Conservative Beit Din with an Orthodox one, nor to propose writing a second document if one objects to altering the ketubah. One must wonder why it would take forty years⁸ for the greatest rabbinic minds of 20th century Orthodox Judaism to go from Column A to Column B.⁹

Given the absence of interdenominational cooperation or immediate alternative solutions by the Orthodox Rabbinate - Rabbi Lamm detailed at length why the Lieberman Clause was invalid but offered no suggestions on how it could be improved - it seems that Orthodox Judaism was more concerned with delegitimizing Conservative Judaism than it was with addressing the agunah problem.¹⁰ The "tradition" which it preserved was not that of Divine Will but of the culture of "Orthodox Judaism." Simply put, a significant subset of Orthodox Judaism prioritized denominational politics over the lives and well-being of agunot, even where legitimate halakhic options were possible with neglible alterations.¹¹ To be sure, enacting major changes in Jewish practice requires widespread consensus especially those with ramifications as significant as the laws of divorce. Opposition based on the halakhic tradition is justified, but doing so in the same of cultural tradition, motivated by socio-religious politics rather than law imposes an inexcusable additional burden for the agunot who, in this war of religious culture, are reduced to collateral damage.¹²

If Rabbis wish to assert on the primacy of halakha over all other considerations, then certainly they can be held to no less of a standard.

Unaccountable Batei Din

The Lieberman Clause and Halakhic Prenup are only effective insofar as the Beit Din which the couple chooses is honorable, trustworthy, and competent. Unfortunately this is by no means a given. In a recent interview with Ami Magazine, Rabbi Herschel Schachter castigated the current Beit Din System for rampant corruption.

Q: Would you call then the problem in the bais din system a crisis?
A: It's worse than a crisis. They tell me that there is a prominent talmid chacham in Flatbush who tells his baalei battim to go to a secular court because they stand a better chance of yoshor [justice] in a goyishe [non-Jewish] court than in a din Torah. If you ask him, he'll deny it, but that's what he tells people. Unfortunately, I think that the comment about yoshor is true.
…
Q: Do you have a problem with the borerim system [in which two of the dayanim are chosen by the litigants and the two dayanim choose a third]?
A: The borerim system is also a shanda. A lot of the borerim act like toanim. I was involved in a din Torah. The borer took shochad (bribes). I had to resign from the case. He felt insulted. It was before Rosh Hashanah, and he told me that he was not going to be mochel [forgive] me. I told him, "I don't need mechila. You took shochad. You're pasul to be a dayan."It says in Shulchan Aruch that you can't have one litigant pay his dayan and the other pay his dayan, unless, which Reb Moshe writes in a teshuva, it is clear that both are being paid the same amount, in which case each one can pay his dayan and they both pay the third. But that isn't what happens. They don't pay the same amount. The payment depends on how long each one bothers the dayan. So they don't pay the same amount and it is true shochad.

Q: You mean that they are not allowed to charge for the private sessions, as well?
A: Of course not. That's shochad! They pay more money for the private sessions, and then the dayan, instead of talking like a dayan, talks like a toain. I was once involved in a din Torah. One of the dayanim was making up his mind: "This side is wealthier than the other, so let him pay." What way to talk is that? A din Torah of a penny has to be treated like a din Torah of a million dollars.

Q: Are you saying there is a problem with the dayanim?
A: Of course. Do you think that all of the dayanim are honest? Many are acting like toanim; many of the toanim are acting like criminals. They make up their minds in advance that their side has to win. I don't walk into a din Torah with the attitude that my side always has to win. If I think my side is wrong, I'll pasken against them. The Rosh in the beginning of Perek Zeh Borer says that people think that their dayan always has to side with them. He has to explore their position; that's true. But not to invent reasoning out of nowhere. Once we had a din Torah here. It was over real estate in California where they had invested a couple of million dollars. We asked them, "Do you want a din Torah, or would you rather have a peshara [compromise]?"We told them that a peshara is not a fifty-fifty split. It is whatever yoshor dictates. They agreed. The din of peshara in this case turned out to be one hundred percent in favor of one person. That was the peshara. They thanked us. They shook hands with us, shook hands with each other. That's the way it should be. Regrettably, dayanim today don't judge with yoshor. [Emphasis added]

But even if a Beit Din is honest and operates with integrity, it can still be ineffectual. Consider the aforementioned case of Aharon Friedman and Tamar Epstein. On 8 September 2011 the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada issued a judgement of contempt known as a seruv (PDF) against Mr. Friedman on the grounds that in addition to refusing to give a get to his wife Tamar, he ignored a "final warning" on 28 June 2011 to appear before that Beit Din: "He was requested to appear before the Beth Din for a final adjudication on the matter of his refusal as well as other matters but he refused to even respond to their request."

Under many circumstances, refusal to appear before a Beit Din is justifiable grounds for a seruv. However, writing for the Washington Jewish Week on 12 January 2011, Rabbi Barry Fruendel explained why the Friedman/Epstein case is unusual.

What started as an ugly divorce needing a get for final resolution has become much more. Public protests, rabbis publicly arguing with Rabbis, New York Times article, viral coverage in other media, a harsh demand that the House Ways and Means committee (the husband's employer) get involved, a public presence of Jewish religious issues in the halls of Congress that makes many of our co-religionists- especially those who work there- very uncomfortable, and painful words exchanged between members of this community, sometimes even between those in the same family, as this issue is discussed and debated.

What happened? Why isn't this simple? The answer is because it is not the usual Agunah case even of the contemporary variety. Usually, in these cases, a husband is summoned to a court and refuses to comply. That leads to a siruv, and to what should be a virtually unanimous decision by the community to reject, protest and pressure the recalcitrant husband to give the get.

But that is not the case here. These two people were before a Bet Din in Baltimore, in fact they both signed that this court would adjudicate the issues between them including the get. For whatever reason after presenting the case but before a verdict, they both took some of these issues to secular court (a violation of Jewish law), and those issues were decided in that tribunal. However the get was not and could not be adjudicated in that forum.

At this time the Baltimore Bet Din is willing to continue the case, or by mutual agreement of the parties, allow it to go to another Bet Din. One or the other of the parties has not yet accepted these possible solutions that might well move the process forward to a conclusion. [Emphasis added]

Thus, while the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada's issued a seruv for Mr. Friedman refusing to respond to their Beit Din, it is clear he did in fact previously respond to a Beit Din, specifically the Beit Din of Baltimore. That Mr. Freidman ignored the request of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis shows that this second Beit Din was not chosen by "mutual consent," but on 5 October 2011, The Vaad Harabannim of Greater Washington with Rabbi Freundel as Vice President, formally declared (PDF) Ms. Epstein an agunah regardless.

Several months ago a very difficult situation involving the unfortunate breakdown of the marital relationship between Aharon Friedman and Tamar Epstein became public within our community. At that time, the Vaad, after careful and thorough consideration, determined that (i) the dispute was pending before the Baltimore Beis Din; (ii) that the Baltimore Beis Din had retained its jurisdiction over the matter; and (iii) that no seruv (order) had been issued declaring Mr. Friedman in breach of the orders of the Beis Din. Accordingly, we indicated at that time that the circumstances did not then warrant our declaring Ms. Epstein and agunah. Since that time there have been new developments, most notably the issuance of a seruv ("Servuv") against Mr. Friedman by the Beis Din of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada which now has jurisdiction over the matter. [Emphasis added]

I am not here to question the legitimacy of the current seruv from the Union of Orthodox Rabbis, nor doubt their claims of jurisdiction.¹³ However, what is clear is that Aharon Friedman and Tamar Epstein did agree to have their divorce resolved in the Beit Din of Baltimore.

Since Tamar Epstein is still an agunah, it is clear that the Beit Din of Baltimore failed in its assigned task. Let us assume, as Rabbi Freundel indicates, that what the Beit Din of Baltimore objected to was that the couple "took some of these issues to secular court." This would imply that the Beit Din of Baltimore did not initially employ a binding arbitration agreement which would legally define their authority. Nor did the Beit Din of Baltimore issue a seruv against either party for contempt of Beit Din, and indeed the Vaad Harabannim of Greater Washington stated, "no seruv (order) had been issued declaring Mr. Friedman in breach of the orders of the Beis Din," which ostensibly would include contempt of leaving the authority of the Beit Din.

Most importantly, as long as the Beit Din of Baltimore retained any jurisdiction of the case, it was in their power to issue their own seruv or use whatever means were at their disposal to ensure that at the very least a get would ultimately be given. If a Beit Din wishes to assert its religious authority, even to the point of imposing communal sanctions against individuals who deny this authority, then there must be rabbinic accountability to justify the fealty which a Beit Din demands. Otherwise no Halakhic Prenup or similar solution will have any effect in front of corrupt, negligent, or incompetent Batei Din.

Conclusions

The problem of agunot is serious, as are the consequences for permitting a halakhically married woman to remarry. But this is not a new problem; even the Talmudic sages recognized the difficulties of agunot and even responded with their own enactments, but within their parameters of halakhah.¹⁴ Today the Halakahic Prenup is gradually gaining acceptance and usage, correcting the politics of the past. Communities such as the Hebrew Institute of Riverdale have formally changed their constitution to exclude recalcitrant spouses and organizations like ORA are taking the initiative in publicly protesting recalcitrant husbands who may otherwise disappear into the communities.

But there is also much work to be done by the Orthodox Rabbinate, particularly regarding educating ethical behavior. Rabbi Moshe Tendler once said in shiur that the problem of agunot really begins in youth, "we teach children to be more concerned with not touching Shabbos candles than with not touching your neighbor's wife." Orthodox Judaism has demonstrated it can selectively ostracize and exclude individuals based on religious transgressions, and it stands to reason it can educate from an early age what behaviors are unacceptable to an observant Jew. I do not expect all marriages to last or all divorces to be amicable. But just as many Orthodox Jews would never consider eating non-Kosher or violating Shabbat, to the point of adopting stringency after stringency, we can educate our community to automatically reject gratuitously spiteful thoughts and actions in divorce.¹⁵ This will obviously take time, effort, and some degree of cooperation, but the benefits in the long run are obvious, to the point it ought to become a Rabbinic imperative for education.

Rabbis are first and foremost educators, defenders, and personal exemplars of Torah. This would ostensibly include prioritizing halakhah over more lesser considerations and ensuring that we are extremely careful and diligent with whatever authority we do have. Some Rabbis have responded to the challenge of agunot, and have become important advocates not only for the women, but for communal awareness and action. But if there is a legitimate criticism with the Rabbis regarding agunot, it should not be for when we do jobs, but rather when we do not.

Works Cited
Bleich, J. David. "A Suggested Antenuptial Agreement: A Proposal in Wake of Avitzur." Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 7 (1984): 25-41.
Broyde, Michael J. "The 1992 New York Get Law." Tradition 29.4 (1995): 5-13.
Epstein, Louis M. "A Solution to the Agunah Problem." Proceedings of the Rabbinical Assembly (1930): 83-90.
Lamm, Norman. "Recent Additions to the Ketubah: A Halakhic Critique." Tradition 2.1 (1959) 93-118.
Levmore, Rachel. "Rabbinic Responses in Favor of Prenuptial Agreements." Tradition 42.1 (2009) 29-49.
Shapiro, Marc B. Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox. Scranton: University of Scranton Press. 2006.

Current Jewish Questions 10 - Solutions to the Agunah Problem Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 10 - Solutions to the Agunah Problem

Current Jewish Questions 9 - Understanding the Agunah Problem Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 9 - Understanding the Agunah Problem

בן ישיבה אינו לוי מהצד ההלכתי, אבל מהצד הרעיוני, הוא בגדר שבט לוי. וכך דברי הרמב"ם בסוף הלכות שמיטה ויובל: "הובדלו מדרכי העולם לא עורכין מלחמה כשאר ישראל... אלא הם חיל ה... ולא שבט לוי בלבד אלא כל איש ואיש מכל באי העולם אשר נדבה רוחו לעמוד לפני ה" עכ"ל. מכאן שזכות גדולה לעם ישראל בשחררו בני תורה מגיוס, ואפילו במלחמת מצוה.

A yeshiva student is not a Levite from a halakhic perspective, but from a logical perspective he is within the scope of being of the tribe of Levi. And this is what Rambam writes at the end of the laws of Shemita and Yovel, "[the Levites] are separated from the ways of the world, they do not arrange wars like the rest of Israel…rather they are soldiers of God…and not only members of the Levite tribe alone but rather any person from the people of the world who dedicate their spirit to stand before God." From here [we infer] that it is a great merit for the Jewish nation to free the children of Torah from the draft, even for a war of obligation.

Based on the portions of Rambam cited, the argument is as follows:

1. Levites are supposed to be exempt from war because they are soldiers to God
2. Anyone who dedicates a life of service to God is considered like a Levite
3. Yeshiva students dedicate their lives to serving God
4. Therefore yeshiva students ought to be exempt from the draft.

While this is not the only halakhic defense for the yeshiva exemption one can find, it is perhaps one of the most dishonest. First, the kuntres assumes that Levites are exempt from milchmet mitzvah – not just milchemet reshut - yet Rambam states that a king can "force the nation" to go to war with no mention of any Levite exemption (Melachim 5:2).

But perhaps more importantly, Rambam would not support the subsidized yeshiva system currently in place in Israel. According to Rambam anyone who gets married before securing an income to support himself is a "fool" (De'ot 5:11), but specifically those who decide to study Torah without working under the expectation that they will be supported through charity, "desecrates the name of God, shames the Torah, extinguishes the light of the law, causes evil to himself, and removes his life from the world to come - for it is prohibited to benefit from the words of Torah in this world" (Talmud Torah 3:10).

This is evident from the passage referenced by the Kuntres but conveniently excised in his ellipses, in which Rambam defines for these "soldiers of God"² what appears to be a monastic lifestyle. In Shemita Ve'Yovel 13:13 Rambam continues:

ויהיה י"י חלקו ונחלתו לעולם ולעולמי עולמים ויזכה לו בעה"ז דבר המספיק לו כמו שזכה לכהנים ללוים

God should be his portion in the world, and he should merit to have in this would what is sufficient for him, just as the Priests and Levites.

If an individual wishes to dedicate his life to God, that is of course his decision. However, there is no indication according to Rambam that he is in any way entitled to public funds or has a right to demand support from the community.

In truth following Rambam consistently may actually help alleviate some of the resentment towards career yeshiva students in Israel who do not serve in the army yet receive substantial benefits from the state. Were we to accept the Kuntres' read of the Rambam, then while students would be exempt from being drafted they should also not expect, demand, or possibly even accept state funding.

The point of this post is less to argue for or against a yeshiva exemption, but to point out just one example of intellectual dishonesty in halakhic discourse through the selective citation of sources. In this case the author of the Kuntres has a predetermined position which he wishes to validate and legitimize by ascribing the position to a prominent halakhic authority. In order to make this point the Kuntres must omit and excise contradictory data, because what Rambam actually says is a minor inconvenience to the ultimate position the Kuntres wishes to advocate.
The discerning scholar should be aware of such methods in halakhic rhetoric and example all arguments critically, regardless of the source or the position being advocated.

Current Jewish Questions 8 - Dina Demalchuta Dina Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 8 - Dina Demalchuta Dina

Current Jewish Questions 7 - Contraception Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 7 - Contraception

Current Jewish Questions 6 - Non-Jews in Jewish Law

Current Jewish Questions 5 - Chukkat Hagoy Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 5 - Chukkat Hagoy

Current Jewish Questions 4 - Superbowl Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 4 - Superbowl

Current Jewish Questions 3 - Chillul Hashem Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 3 - Chillul Hashem

The topic of "tzniut" or "modesty" has recently become a prominent point of discussion in the Jewish community, mostly in response recent incidents of religious violence in Israel (some of which we covered in the previous class on Religious Coercion). Recent essays by Rabbi Dov Linzer in the New York Times, Rabbi Aryeh Klapper for a Rabbinical Council of America blog, and an earlier one by Rabbi Marc Angel for The Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals have all attempted to present a more "moderate" view from what is often conveyed by Orthodox Jewish society.

But the common theme in these essays, and indeed what dominates the discussion of Jewish modesty, is almost exclusively framing the issue in the context of women. In particular, modesty is most frequently defined in terms of how women ought to dress, how a woman is supposed to behave, and in some general instances the appropriate role of women in Jewish if not secular society. With this focus on women, it is not surprising that tzniut/modesty is almost exclusively construed as a sexual ethic.

In this shiur I challenge this assumption by approaching the topic of modesty not from the socially defined understanding of tzniut, but rather how and when the root "צנע" is used in the Talmud. While the term is certainly used in the context of female sexuality or displays of femininity (B. Ketuvot 3b, B. Berachot 8b, B. Shabbat 113b, B. Sotah 49b), the Rabbinic tradition also applies tzniut to men as it pertains to his relationship with his wife (B. Shabbat 53b) and his mode of dress (B. Menachot 43a). Furthermore, the ethic of tzniut is asserted in the contexts of going to the bathroom (B. Berachot 8b, 62a), eating (B. Berachot 8b), not displaying one's wealth (B. Pesachim 113a), and even religious observance (M. Ma'aser Sheni 5:1, B. Sukkah 49b/B. Makkot 24a). (These and additional sources are in the attached source sheet with a modified Soncino translation.)

Given the contextual range of the root צנע, I suggest that tzniut in the Rabbinic tradition may best be described not as a sexual ethic at all (let alone a female one), but a general attitude of behavior of which sexual behavior is only one component. In other words, the true Jewish ethos of modesty does not exclusively pertain to sexuality, but rather reflects a universal ethic, one which is equally applicable to men and women in all facets of life.

Current Jewish Questions 2 - Tzniut / Modesty Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 2 - Tzniut-Modesty

Current Jewish Questions 1 - Religious Coercion Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 1 - Religious Coercion

Fundamentals of Judaism 6 - Varieties of Rabbinic Fallibility Sources (PDF)

Fundamentals of Judaism 6 - Varieties of Rabbinic Fallibility

One day after our regular Yoreh Deah class, the Rosh Yeshiva called us in to give us some mussar. There was a concern that husbands and wives from other couples were socializing excessively with each other. After all, the Torah teaches "Be Holy" (Lev. 19:2 which Ramban interprets as "הוו פרושים מן העריות ומן העבירה" - separate yourself from illicit behavior and sin, and so forth.

I will stress here that I am/was unaware of any incident which could be classified in any way as inappropriate. Most of the kollel couples knew each other before coming and the relatively cloistered environment would understandably lead to inter-socialization. And even the Rosh Yeshiva had mentioned that he wasn't responding to anything in particular, but was just making a general observation and expressing a concern.

Strictly speaking, this concern is not entirely unjustified. M. Avot 1:5 states explicitly, "Do not talk excessively with women. This was said about one's own wife; how much more so about the wife of one's neighbor" and B. Nedarim 20a explains that it is because this speech will lead to adultery.

Something else occurred to me at that time. The audience here consisted of rabbinical students who would at some point venture into communities as actual rabbis, which at some point would entail talking to women. One would hope that rabbis ought to be able to converse with female constituents without viewing them as sex objects, and if there were any doubt on this point then perhaps they ought not remain rabbinical students. If there was any concern of the moral integrity of the future rabbis of America, then perhaps we had bigger problems on our hands.

But it also occurred to me that it is precisely because of the nature of our profession that this mussar was appropriate. Most professional rabbis have countless interactions with congregants or students. If a rabbi is particularly outgoing or friendly, it is not inconceivable for a conversation to be interpreted in a way other than what was intended.² In short, if interpersonal boundaries are important for Jews, they are much more so for professional rabbis.

I do not know if this was the message the Rosh Yeshiva actually intended, but it was an important lesson nonetheless.

RCA Reaffirms Policies regarding Same Sex Attraction and Marriage, while Clarifying its Position on Reparative Therapy

In light of the extensive media coverage concerning the attitude of Orthodox Judaism towards homosexuality, the Rabbinical Council of America, the largest Rabbinical group within Orthodox Judaism, has decided to issue the following clarifications:

1. The Torah and Jewish tradition, in the clearest of terms, prohibit the practice of homosexuality. Same-sex unions are against both the letter and the spirit of Jewish law, which sanctions only the union of a man and a woman in matrimony.

2. Attempts to ritualize or celebrate same-sex unions are antithetical to Jewish law. Any clergyman who performs or celebrates a same-sex union cannot claim the mantle of Orthodox Judaism.

3. While homosexual behavior is prohibited, individuals with homosexual inclinations should be treated with the care and concern appropriate to all human beings. As Rabbis we recognize the acute and painful challenges faced by homosexual Jews in their quest to remain connected and faithful to God and tradition. We urge those Orthodox Jews with homosexual tendencies to seek counsel from their Rabbis. Equally, we urge all Rabbis to show compassion to all those who approach them.

4. On the subject of reparative therapy, it is our view that, as Rabbis, we can neither endorse nor reject any therapy or method that is intended to assist those who are struggling with same-sex attraction. We insist, however, that therapy of any type be performed only by licensed, trained practitioners. In addition, we maintain that no individual should be coerced to participate in a therapeutic course with which he or she is acutely uncomfortable.

5. We pray that God will ease the way for all who struggle with a full heart to feel His presence in their lives.

Confronting Chosenness 7 - Matan Torah in Rabbinic Thought Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 7 - Matan Torah in Rabbinic Thought

And most recently, in response to the Orthodox ordained Rabbi Steve Greenberg officiating a same-sex wedding, over one hundred rabbis signed a proclamation intending to "correct the false impression that an Orthodox-approved same-gender wedding took place," stating, "By definition, a union that is not sanctioned by Torah law is not an Orthodox wedding, and by definition a person who conducts such a ceremony is not an Orthodox rabbi."

The point here is not to discuss the substance of these issues (though I have done so here, here, and here respectively) but the significance and perceived necessity of such exclusionary proclamations. After all, significantly worse infractions of Jewish law and tradition by more prominent rabbis and institutions have not merited the similar disqualification of being "non-Orthodox."

Instances of sexual abuse in the Orthodox world are not infrequent. Brooklyn D.A. Charles Hynes' office reports 89 related arrests, though this exact number may be inflated. Still, there have been several publicized accounts and allegations of sexual abuse in Orthodox youth institutions worldwide the most infamous ones being Yehuda Kolko and Baruch Lanner. Amid various allegations of sexual misconduct, Leib Tropper resigned from his Eternal Jewish Family organization, Mordechai Tendler was expelled from the Rabbinical Council of America and later suspended by his congregation. The list unfortunately goes on.

Yet despite Rabbis engaging in sexual misconduct, there has been no declaration that those guilty are not to be considered "Orthodox." Some rabbis who either ignored or concealed such abuse could even be considered gedolim. Yet while Rabbi Steve Greenberg has been deemed "non-Orthodox" for officiating a halakhically illegal wedding, there has been no such declarations of "non-Orthodox" for Rabbis who in their abuse of students violate prohibitions of homosexual activity (in addition to damage caused by pedophelia).

There other crimes and halakhic violations committed by Jewish leaders or their institutions. In July 2009, forty four people were arrested in Operation Big Rig 3 including prominent Jewish leaders in the Syrian community for crimes including money laundering, political corruption, and organ trafficking. When these or other such scandals break, there is no similar call from Jewish leaders that such perpetrators and sanctioning organizations are "non-Orthodox." Even the esteemed leaders of the aforementioned Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah Of America are not immune to scandal. In 1986, R. Dovid Feinstein's yeshiva Mesivtha Tifereth Jerusalem was involved in its own money laundering scandal. To my knowledge, no one claimed that MTJ or its leaders were "non-Orthodox" despite public violations of Jewish law.

To be sure, no organization would define itself by these violations of Halakhah and no rabbi or institution would state publicly that financial or sexual crimes are permitted and justified, let alone defining characteristics of their religious system. Unlike the ritual innovations cited earlier, no one has stated that molestation is Orthodox, and thus would not warrant the same type of exclusionary condemnation - though perhaps such a declaration and social ostracization may help stem abuse. However there are in fact other crimes committed by Orthodox Jews which are routinely done in the name of Orthodox Judaism, if not with the blessing and encouragement of prominent rabbinic figures.

In Israel, Charedim have repeatedly vandalized property in the name of their religion. One bookstore in Me'ah Shearim was forced to submit to the thuggish tactics of the self-appointed modesty police. Religious conflicts have also erupted in violence, again in the name of their religious beliefs. There have also been reports of physical assaults against women. One woman was recently attacked on a bus. In 2008 a woman was brutally attacked from a "modesty squad" which "has declared a crusade against violations of Halachic law and what it views as 'unchaste' behavior." Perhaps the most extreme example of advocating religiously sanctioned violence is Rabbi Dov Lior who wrote a book in which he legitimized killing non Jews based on his understanding of Jewish law. In all these instances of Chareidi violence and intimidation in the name of Judaism, there have been no calls to deem these halakhic violators, their rabbinic leadership, or their supporting institutions "non-Orthodox." If anything, these people are called "ultra-Orthodox," implying that their brand of Judaism is quantifiably greater than others, regardless of whether or not they act in accordance with halakhah.

And so the question remains why are only some actions elicit the "non-Orthodox" label. Let us assume that the term "non-Orthodox" will be used when there is the greatest threat posed to Orthodox Judaism.

But what then counts as the "greatest threat" and how would this be defined? Clearly it is not a matter of a transgression's prevalence. There are more incidents of fraud, corruption, and sexual impropriety in the Orthodox community than there are rabbis who make significant unprecedented changes to Jewish ritual practice. If traditional Torah observance is the goal then it would seem logical to attack the most common if not systemic violations Jewish law as "non-Orthodox" than relatively isolated incidents.

Nor are the threats defined by their halakhic severity. Not saying shelo asani isha is at worst a passive neglect of a commandment mandated by the rabbinic sages, but according to the Shulhan Aruch, stealing from non-Jews is an active violation of biblical law (C.M. 348:2). Officiating a same-sex wedding violates a biblical prohibition, whereas a rabbi raping a male student would violate the famed "abomination" of Leviticus 18:22. Even Rabbi Shafran concedes that ordaining women rabbis does not violate halakhah, as opposed to causing damage to others (B. Bava Batra 22b). If observance of Torah is the goal of Orthodox Judaism than ostensibly it ought to be less concerned with permitted variations within Halakhah then with outright violations of halakhah.

The real reason for the apparent ideological inconsistency is that contrary to popular belief, "Orthodox Judaism" is not a religious designation based on Torah but a social one embellished with religious rhetoric. Certain halakhic violations may be tolerated as "Orthodox" if they do not challenge the social system of obedience, but any challenge to the Orthodox establishment can be considered heretical - even if they do not actually violate Jewish law. Note that the direction of "non-Orthodox" charges goes only in the direction of right to left. That is, only the so-called "liberal" Jews are branded "non-Orthodox," but halakhically deviant extremists on the other end of the religious spectrum are still within the fold because despite their violations of Jewish law, they do not threaten the socio-religous system based on submission to authority.

Thus the controversies of "non-Orthodox" are nothing more than a territorial claim of the "Orthodox" franchise, and which side gets to portray itself as religiously authentic. By the same token, any claim that a person or position is "non-Orthodox" may be correct insofar as they challenge the religious establishment's status quo. It is a descriptive statement of a social reality. Based on the subjective social norms of Orthodox Judaism, one who does not keep kosher may not be considered Orthodox, as opposed to a child molester who follows the overt norms of religious speech, dress, and observance. The religion of Orthodox Judaism is best defined not in terms of adherance to Torah, but tautalogically, adherence to Orthodox Judaism itself - whatever that might happen to mean.

This is the true point of confusion regarding Orthodox Judaism. The popular understanding is that Orthodox Jews are somehow "more observant" than non-Orthodox Jews, and for the most part this is true - especially as it pertains to observing rituals. But it clearly does not mean that the practice of Orthodox Jews is entirely consistent with Jewish law. I would argue that whether or not one is classified as "Orthodox" is irrelevant according to Jewish law. Halakhah mandates performing what God and the Rabbinic Sages commanded and refrain from their prohibitions, in other words, being a "Shomer Torah" - meaning to keep the written and oral laws of Judaism. For if we assume the purpose of Judaism is to fulfill God's will, then it would seem God cares more about adhering to his commandments than to fitting in with an "Orthodox" society.

To conclude, I am not justifying or defending any of the actions cited above which were deemed "non-Orthodox," nor am I saying that Orthodox Judaism is an intrinsically corrupt enterprise. What I am arguing is that through the selective outrage and silence of others, we can identify the priorities of those who feel the need to exclude others as "non-Orthodox." Even if we do not apply the principle of shetikah ke'hoda'ah, equating silence as tacit consent, where people choose to fight their battles is as revealing of their priorities as the arguments themselves. From my perspective, I have noticed considerably more outrage directed against observant committed Jews who innovate within the bounds of Jewish law, though differently than to what others are accustomed, than there is against the social crimes listed above. I see Orthodox Judaism more concerned with protecting its brand and reputation than it is with enforcing the Torah which it claims to adhere. It is a matter of priorities, and in this case the priorities of the Orthodox Jewish world are not primarily defined or determined by the Torah.

For those who are committed to being a shomer Torah, I leave you with the following thought. If women rabbis or omitting a blessing are greater threats to Orthodox Judaism, and thus more worthy of collective outrage than are theft, violence, corruption, and abuse, then perhaps the Orthodox society has outlived its halakhic usefulness.

Confronting Chosenness 6 - Avraham in Rabbinic Thought Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 6 - Avraham in Rabbinic Thought

Fundamentals of Judaism 5 - Basis for Rabbinic Authority Sources (PDF)

Fundamentals of Judaism 5 - Basis for Rabbinic Authority

Confronting Chosenness 5 - Rabbinic Perspectives Cosmic vs Conditional Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 5 - Rabbinic Perspectives Cosmic vs Conditional

I will not go into a full treatment here of the multiple opinions, but I've found people seem genuinely shocked when I cite the opinion of the Shulhan Aruch, a usually acceptable source which in this case is relatively lenient compared to other opinions or conventional understanding.

First, here is the relevant source:

שולחן ערוך יורה דעה הלכות בשר בחלב סימן צה
סעיף ג
קערות של בשר שהודחו ביורה חולבת בחמין שהיד סולדת בהן, אפילו שניהם בני יומן, מותר, משום דהוה ליה נותן טעם בר נותן טעם דהתירא. והוא שיאמר ברי לי שלא היה שום שומן דבוק בהן. ואם היה שומן דבוק בהן, צריך שיהא במים ס' כנגד ממשות שומן שעל פי הקערה.

סעיף ד
יראה לי שאם נתנו אפר במים חמין שביורה קודם שהניחו הקדירות בתוכה, אף על פי שהשומן דבוק בהן, מותר, דעל ידי האפר הוא נותן טעם לפגם

Shulhan Aruch Yoreh Deah 95:3-4
Meat plates washed in a dairy cauldron, hot enough such that one's hand burns (the halakhic temperature for absorbency), even if both had been used within one day, it is permitted because it is gives a secondary tasting (noten ta'am bar noten ta'am, too much to detail here). And this is where he says I am certain that there is no fat stuck to the plate, and if there was meat fat stuck, then there must be 60 parts water in the pot compared to the meat fat [such that it would be nullified in batel beshishim]

It seems to me that if one put ashes in the hot water in the pot before one put in the pot, even though there is fat stuck it is permitted because the ashes will ruin the taste.

Kashrut follows a principle of ta'am k'ikar, meaning even the taste of an item (e.g. meat, or a non-kosher food) is equivalent to the item itself, and there are numerous laws regarding how "taste" can transfer. However, if the item in question would be notein ta'am lifgam - give over its taste to detriment i.e. an undesirable addition - then the taste in question would not halakhically absorb. I know it may sound confusing, but this is the best I can summarize Yoreh Deah in a paragraph.¹

According to the Shulhan Aruch cited above, the addition of "ashes" to a pot of hot water is sufficient to mitigate the taste transference from meat dishes to dairy dishes, even when there is actual residual meat fat stuck to the dish itself. Today we do not use ashes but dishwasher detergent which I suspect also ruins any leftover food such as to make it inedible. Therefore, for the Shulhan Aruch it would be permissible to wash meat and dairy dishes in the same dishwasher at the same time. Furthermore, operating on the very reasonable assumption that dishwashers are only run with some form of detergent, there would be no need to kasher a dishwasher if it has been previously used for non-kosher dishes.

This is not to say the Shulhan Aruch is the only opinion regarding dishwashers - some are more stringent and others are lenient for other/additional reasons.²

However, it is still useful to know it exists, and useful for me to have a direct link.

Fundamentals of Judaism 4 - What God Wants Sources (PDF)

Fundamentals of Judaism 4 - What God Wants

Confronting Chosenness 4 - Jews and Non-Jews in the Bible Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 4 - Jews and Non-Jews in the Bible

Greenberg assisted Bock and Kaplan in creating a ceremonial text that reflected the uniqueness of the event while incorporating the traditional elements of a Jewish wedding. Those familiar with the latter would have noticed an alteration in many of the texts, including the changing of genders for several of the pronouns. "Harey at mekudeshet li," or "Behold, you (female) are consecrated to me" thus became "Harey atah m’kudash li," or "Behold, you (male) are consecrated to me."

While the news article emphasizes Rabbi Greenberg's credentials as holding an Orthodox ordination, the Orthodox world has repudiated the religious legitimization, let alone officiating, same-sex marriages. Even the recent Statement of Principles, an important template for integrating and including homosexuals in an Orthodox community, specifically excludes same-sex marriages:

11. Halakhic Judaism cannot give its blessing and imprimatur to Jewish religious same-sex commitment ceremonies and weddings, and halakhic values proscribe individuals and communities from encouraging practices that grant religious legitimacy to gay marriage and couplehood

Still, those accustomed to halakhic debates may contest this point. After all, the Bible only explicitly prohibits sexual relations between men. Marriage, on the other hand, may be construed as a ceremony of love or commitment, and does not necessarily imply that the couple would in fact engage in halakhicallyprohibited sexual activity.¹
To some, this argument may seem like halakhic hairsplitting to achieve a desired result, but the underlying assumption is crucial to the halakhic process. In order to assert that an action is prohibited in Jewish law, one must provide textual evidence from Biblical or Rabbinic sources to demonstrate how the action in question would be either Biblically or Rabbinically prohibited based on existing halakhic interpretation or legislation.

I submit that Jewish law does in fact prohibit same-sex marriage ceremonies, and does so explicitly.

When the Jewish people were still travelling in the desert, they were warned not to copy the practices, or more literally "statutes," of either the Egyptians or Canaanites. Leviticus 18:3 states:

כְּמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם אֲשֶׁר יְשַׁבְתֶּם בָּהּ לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ וּכְמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם לֹא תֵלֵכוּ:

After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do; and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do; neither shall ye walk in their statutes

The chapter continues enumerating prohibited sexual relations including the prohibition regarding gay sex in 18:22. However the idiom "וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם לֹא תֵלֵכוּ" – following their statutes – is general prohibition, which unsurprisingly is addressed in rabbinic literature.

In the rabbinic text Sifra Achrei Mot 9:8 we find the following exposition:

לא אמרתי אלא בחוקים החקוקים להם ולאבותיהם ולאבות אבותיהם ומה היו עושים האיש נושא לאיש והאשה לאשה, האיש נושא אשה ובתה והאשה ניסת לשנים לכך נאמר ובחקותיהם לא תלכו.

I did not say this [prohibition] except for the statutes enacted by them, their fathers, and their father's fathers. And what would they do? A man would marry a man, a woman [would marry] a woman, a man would marry a woman and her daughter, and a woman would marry two men. Therefore it says, "and in their statutes do not follow."

This text of the Sifra is a halakhic midrash, which is to say legal exegesis with the effect of determining normative Jewish law.² According to this Rabbinic source, the specific actions prohibited by Lev. 18:3 include the men marrying men and women marrying women.

It is important to clarify that the word "נשא" or "marry" does not imply that the union has any halakhic validity. All marriages (נשואין) must be preceded by a formal declaration of an intent to marry called kiddushin (קדושין). Not only must this act of kiddushin be between a man and a woman, but the relations between these two individuals must not be prohibited by Jewish law, otherwise the act of kiddushin is meaningless (B. Yevamot 53a, Rambm Ishut 4:12).³ It is thus my understanding of Sifra Achrei Mot 9:8 that the prohibition does not refer to any halakhically binding marriage, but rather any equivalent or comparably ceremony and by extension any formal union would violate the prohibition of "וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם לֹא תֵלֵכוּ" - not following in their (i.e. the Egyptian or Canaanite) statutes.

This midrash is not contradicted in later rabbinic sources, and indeed it does not reappear except for inclusion in later midrashic compilations, though it does appear sporadically in later halakhic codes such as Rambam Issurei Biah 22:8 and Vilna Gaon in Biur HaGra EH 20:11.

I would argue that this omission is not indicative of a rejection of the midrashic law, but if anything, indicates that for various reasons the sages deemed it obvious, superfluous, and unnecessary to repeat or include. Consider that homosexuality was not a practical concern for the rabbinic sages. While they enacted the laws of yichud prohibiting seclusion of individuals who are 'arayot (people with whom relations are forbidden), they intentionally made no such decree for two men on the grounds that Jewish men are not suspect of homosexuality (B. Kiddushin 82a). It is also conceivable that codifiers of halakhah considered the marriage to be an obvious extension from the prohibited relationship. In other words, they may not have sufficiently distinguished between commitment ceremonies and the forbidden sexual relationships implied therein. Not only would these ceremonies be considered an anomalous rarity, but they could easily be implicitly subscribed under the prohibitions of sexual activity.

As such, regardless of how Jewish communities accommodate the needs of gays in their respective communities, the formal recognition of a homosexual marriage - male or female - would in fact be condoning a halakhicaly prohibited union, regardless of the private behaviors of the individuals. It would therefore follow that Rabbis who are committed to halakha should therefore not officiate or participate in these ceremonies, nor should halakhic communities formally recognize the couple as such, as they would with any other union prohibited by Jewish law.

This is not to negate any of the other points of the aforementioned Statement of Principles, which I should note I personally signed. But it is important to remember that for shomrei Torah the boundaries of pluralism must always be defined by the arba amot of halakhah - the four cubits of Jewish Law.

Fundamentals of Judaism 3 - God in the Torah Sources (PDF)

Fundamentals of Judaism 3 - God in the Torah