Current Jewish Questions 3 - Chillul Hashem Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 3 - Chillul Hashem

The topic of "tzniut" or "modesty" has recently become a prominent point of discussion in the Jewish community, mostly in response recent incidents of religious violence in Israel (some of which we covered in the previous class on Religious Coercion). Recent essays by Rabbi Dov Linzer in the New York Times, Rabbi Aryeh Klapper for a Rabbinical Council of America blog, and an earlier one by Rabbi Marc Angel for The Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals have all attempted to present a more "moderate" view from what is often conveyed by Orthodox Jewish society.

But the common theme in these essays, and indeed what dominates the discussion of Jewish modesty, is almost exclusively framing the issue in the context of women. In particular, modesty is most frequently defined in terms of how women ought to dress, how a woman is supposed to behave, and in some general instances the appropriate role of women in Jewish if not secular society. With this focus on women, it is not surprising that tzniut/modesty is almost exclusively construed as a sexual ethic.

In this shiur I challenge this assumption by approaching the topic of modesty not from the socially defined understanding of tzniut, but rather how and when the root "צנע" is used in the Talmud. While the term is certainly used in the context of female sexuality or displays of femininity (B. Ketuvot 3b, B. Berachot 8b, B. Shabbat 113b, B. Sotah 49b), the Rabbinic tradition also applies tzniut to men as it pertains to his relationship with his wife (B. Shabbat 53b) and his mode of dress (B. Menachot 43a). Furthermore, the ethic of tzniut is asserted in the contexts of going to the bathroom (B. Berachot 8b, 62a), eating (B. Berachot 8b), not displaying one's wealth (B. Pesachim 113a), and even religious observance (M. Ma'aser Sheni 5:1, B. Sukkah 49b/B. Makkot 24a). (These and additional sources are in the attached source sheet with a modified Soncino translation.)

Given the contextual range of the root צנע, I suggest that tzniut in the Rabbinic tradition may best be described not as a sexual ethic at all (let alone a female one), but a general attitude of behavior of which sexual behavior is only one component. In other words, the true Jewish ethos of modesty does not exclusively pertain to sexuality, but rather reflects a universal ethic, one which is equally applicable to men and women in all facets of life.

Current Jewish Questions 2 - Tzniut / Modesty Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 2 - Tzniut-Modesty

Current Jewish Questions 1 - Religious Coercion Sources (PDF)

Current Jewish Questions 1 - Religious Coercion

Fundamentals of Judaism 6 - Varieties of Rabbinic Fallibility Sources (PDF)

Fundamentals of Judaism 6 - Varieties of Rabbinic Fallibility

One day after our regular Yoreh Deah class, the Rosh Yeshiva called us in to give us some mussar. There was a concern that husbands and wives from other couples were socializing excessively with each other. After all, the Torah teaches "Be Holy" (Lev. 19:2 which Ramban interprets as "הוו פרושים מן העריות ומן העבירה" - separate yourself from illicit behavior and sin, and so forth.

I will stress here that I am/was unaware of any incident which could be classified in any way as inappropriate. Most of the kollel couples knew each other before coming and the relatively cloistered environment would understandably lead to inter-socialization. And even the Rosh Yeshiva had mentioned that he wasn't responding to anything in particular, but was just making a general observation and expressing a concern.

Strictly speaking, this concern is not entirely unjustified. M. Avot 1:5 states explicitly, "Do not talk excessively with women. This was said about one's own wife; how much more so about the wife of one's neighbor" and B. Nedarim 20a explains that it is because this speech will lead to adultery.

Something else occurred to me at that time. The audience here consisted of rabbinical students who would at some point venture into communities as actual rabbis, which at some point would entail talking to women. One would hope that rabbis ought to be able to converse with female constituents without viewing them as sex objects, and if there were any doubt on this point then perhaps they ought not remain rabbinical students. If there was any concern of the moral integrity of the future rabbis of America, then perhaps we had bigger problems on our hands.

But it also occurred to me that it is precisely because of the nature of our profession that this mussar was appropriate. Most professional rabbis have countless interactions with congregants or students. If a rabbi is particularly outgoing or friendly, it is not inconceivable for a conversation to be interpreted in a way other than what was intended.² In short, if interpersonal boundaries are important for Jews, they are much more so for professional rabbis.

I do not know if this was the message the Rosh Yeshiva actually intended, but it was an important lesson nonetheless.

RCA Reaffirms Policies regarding Same Sex Attraction and Marriage, while Clarifying its Position on Reparative Therapy

In light of the extensive media coverage concerning the attitude of Orthodox Judaism towards homosexuality, the Rabbinical Council of America, the largest Rabbinical group within Orthodox Judaism, has decided to issue the following clarifications:

1. The Torah and Jewish tradition, in the clearest of terms, prohibit the practice of homosexuality. Same-sex unions are against both the letter and the spirit of Jewish law, which sanctions only the union of a man and a woman in matrimony.

2. Attempts to ritualize or celebrate same-sex unions are antithetical to Jewish law. Any clergyman who performs or celebrates a same-sex union cannot claim the mantle of Orthodox Judaism.

3. While homosexual behavior is prohibited, individuals with homosexual inclinations should be treated with the care and concern appropriate to all human beings. As Rabbis we recognize the acute and painful challenges faced by homosexual Jews in their quest to remain connected and faithful to God and tradition. We urge those Orthodox Jews with homosexual tendencies to seek counsel from their Rabbis. Equally, we urge all Rabbis to show compassion to all those who approach them.

4. On the subject of reparative therapy, it is our view that, as Rabbis, we can neither endorse nor reject any therapy or method that is intended to assist those who are struggling with same-sex attraction. We insist, however, that therapy of any type be performed only by licensed, trained practitioners. In addition, we maintain that no individual should be coerced to participate in a therapeutic course with which he or she is acutely uncomfortable.

5. We pray that God will ease the way for all who struggle with a full heart to feel His presence in their lives.

Confronting Chosenness 7 - Matan Torah in Rabbinic Thought Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 7 - Matan Torah in Rabbinic Thought

And most recently, in response to the Orthodox ordained Rabbi Steve Greenberg officiating a same-sex wedding, over one hundred rabbis signed a proclamation intending to "correct the false impression that an Orthodox-approved same-gender wedding took place," stating, "By definition, a union that is not sanctioned by Torah law is not an Orthodox wedding, and by definition a person who conducts such a ceremony is not an Orthodox rabbi."

The point here is not to discuss the substance of these issues (though I have done so here, here, and here respectively) but the significance and perceived necessity of such exclusionary proclamations. After all, significantly worse infractions of Jewish law and tradition by more prominent rabbis and institutions have not merited the similar disqualification of being "non-Orthodox."

Instances of sexual abuse in the Orthodox world are not infrequent. Brooklyn D.A. Charles Hynes' office reports 89 related arrests, though this exact number may be inflated. Still, there have been several publicized accounts and allegations of sexual abuse in Orthodox youth institutions worldwide the most infamous ones being Yehuda Kolko and Baruch Lanner. Amid various allegations of sexual misconduct, Leib Tropper resigned from his Eternal Jewish Family organization, Mordechai Tendler was expelled from the Rabbinical Council of America and later suspended by his congregation. The list unfortunately goes on.

Yet despite Rabbis engaging in sexual misconduct, there has been no declaration that those guilty are not to be considered "Orthodox." Some rabbis who either ignored or concealed such abuse could even be considered gedolim. Yet while Rabbi Steve Greenberg has been deemed "non-Orthodox" for officiating a halakhically illegal wedding, there has been no such declarations of "non-Orthodox" for Rabbis who in their abuse of students violate prohibitions of homosexual activity (in addition to damage caused by pedophelia).

There other crimes and halakhic violations committed by Jewish leaders or their institutions. In July 2009, forty four people were arrested in Operation Big Rig 3 including prominent Jewish leaders in the Syrian community for crimes including money laundering, political corruption, and organ trafficking. When these or other such scandals break, there is no similar call from Jewish leaders that such perpetrators and sanctioning organizations are "non-Orthodox." Even the esteemed leaders of the aforementioned Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah Of America are not immune to scandal. In 1986, R. Dovid Feinstein's yeshiva Mesivtha Tifereth Jerusalem was involved in its own money laundering scandal. To my knowledge, no one claimed that MTJ or its leaders were "non-Orthodox" despite public violations of Jewish law.

To be sure, no organization would define itself by these violations of Halakhah and no rabbi or institution would state publicly that financial or sexual crimes are permitted and justified, let alone defining characteristics of their religious system. Unlike the ritual innovations cited earlier, no one has stated that molestation is Orthodox, and thus would not warrant the same type of exclusionary condemnation - though perhaps such a declaration and social ostracization may help stem abuse. However there are in fact other crimes committed by Orthodox Jews which are routinely done in the name of Orthodox Judaism, if not with the blessing and encouragement of prominent rabbinic figures.

In Israel, Charedim have repeatedly vandalized property in the name of their religion. One bookstore in Me'ah Shearim was forced to submit to the thuggish tactics of the self-appointed modesty police. Religious conflicts have also erupted in violence, again in the name of their religious beliefs. There have also been reports of physical assaults against women. One woman was recently attacked on a bus. In 2008 a woman was brutally attacked from a "modesty squad" which "has declared a crusade against violations of Halachic law and what it views as 'unchaste' behavior." Perhaps the most extreme example of advocating religiously sanctioned violence is Rabbi Dov Lior who wrote a book in which he legitimized killing non Jews based on his understanding of Jewish law. In all these instances of Chareidi violence and intimidation in the name of Judaism, there have been no calls to deem these halakhic violators, their rabbinic leadership, or their supporting institutions "non-Orthodox." If anything, these people are called "ultra-Orthodox," implying that their brand of Judaism is quantifiably greater than others, regardless of whether or not they act in accordance with halakhah.

And so the question remains why are only some actions elicit the "non-Orthodox" label. Let us assume that the term "non-Orthodox" will be used when there is the greatest threat posed to Orthodox Judaism.

But what then counts as the "greatest threat" and how would this be defined? Clearly it is not a matter of a transgression's prevalence. There are more incidents of fraud, corruption, and sexual impropriety in the Orthodox community than there are rabbis who make significant unprecedented changes to Jewish ritual practice. If traditional Torah observance is the goal then it would seem logical to attack the most common if not systemic violations Jewish law as "non-Orthodox" than relatively isolated incidents.

Nor are the threats defined by their halakhic severity. Not saying shelo asani isha is at worst a passive neglect of a commandment mandated by the rabbinic sages, but according to the Shulhan Aruch, stealing from non-Jews is an active violation of biblical law (C.M. 348:2). Officiating a same-sex wedding violates a biblical prohibition, whereas a rabbi raping a male student would violate the famed "abomination" of Leviticus 18:22. Even Rabbi Shafran concedes that ordaining women rabbis does not violate halakhah, as opposed to causing damage to others (B. Bava Batra 22b). If observance of Torah is the goal of Orthodox Judaism than ostensibly it ought to be less concerned with permitted variations within Halakhah then with outright violations of halakhah.

The real reason for the apparent ideological inconsistency is that contrary to popular belief, "Orthodox Judaism" is not a religious designation based on Torah but a social one embellished with religious rhetoric. Certain halakhic violations may be tolerated as "Orthodox" if they do not challenge the social system of obedience, but any challenge to the Orthodox establishment can be considered heretical - even if they do not actually violate Jewish law. Note that the direction of "non-Orthodox" charges goes only in the direction of right to left. That is, only the so-called "liberal" Jews are branded "non-Orthodox," but halakhically deviant extremists on the other end of the religious spectrum are still within the fold because despite their violations of Jewish law, they do not threaten the socio-religous system based on submission to authority.

Thus the controversies of "non-Orthodox" are nothing more than a territorial claim of the "Orthodox" franchise, and which side gets to portray itself as religiously authentic. By the same token, any claim that a person or position is "non-Orthodox" may be correct insofar as they challenge the religious establishment's status quo. It is a descriptive statement of a social reality. Based on the subjective social norms of Orthodox Judaism, one who does not keep kosher may not be considered Orthodox, as opposed to a child molester who follows the overt norms of religious speech, dress, and observance. The religion of Orthodox Judaism is best defined not in terms of adherance to Torah, but tautalogically, adherence to Orthodox Judaism itself - whatever that might happen to mean.

This is the true point of confusion regarding Orthodox Judaism. The popular understanding is that Orthodox Jews are somehow "more observant" than non-Orthodox Jews, and for the most part this is true - especially as it pertains to observing rituals. But it clearly does not mean that the practice of Orthodox Jews is entirely consistent with Jewish law. I would argue that whether or not one is classified as "Orthodox" is irrelevant according to Jewish law. Halakhah mandates performing what God and the Rabbinic Sages commanded and refrain from their prohibitions, in other words, being a "Shomer Torah" - meaning to keep the written and oral laws of Judaism. For if we assume the purpose of Judaism is to fulfill God's will, then it would seem God cares more about adhering to his commandments than to fitting in with an "Orthodox" society.

To conclude, I am not justifying or defending any of the actions cited above which were deemed "non-Orthodox," nor am I saying that Orthodox Judaism is an intrinsically corrupt enterprise. What I am arguing is that through the selective outrage and silence of others, we can identify the priorities of those who feel the need to exclude others as "non-Orthodox." Even if we do not apply the principle of shetikah ke'hoda'ah, equating silence as tacit consent, where people choose to fight their battles is as revealing of their priorities as the arguments themselves. From my perspective, I have noticed considerably more outrage directed against observant committed Jews who innovate within the bounds of Jewish law, though differently than to what others are accustomed, than there is against the social crimes listed above. I see Orthodox Judaism more concerned with protecting its brand and reputation than it is with enforcing the Torah which it claims to adhere. It is a matter of priorities, and in this case the priorities of the Orthodox Jewish world are not primarily defined or determined by the Torah.

For those who are committed to being a shomer Torah, I leave you with the following thought. If women rabbis or omitting a blessing are greater threats to Orthodox Judaism, and thus more worthy of collective outrage than are theft, violence, corruption, and abuse, then perhaps the Orthodox society has outlived its halakhic usefulness.

Confronting Chosenness 6 - Avraham in Rabbinic Thought Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 6 - Avraham in Rabbinic Thought

Fundamentals of Judaism 5 - Basis for Rabbinic Authority Sources (PDF)

Fundamentals of Judaism 5 - Basis for Rabbinic Authority

Confronting Chosenness 5 - Rabbinic Perspectives Cosmic vs Conditional Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 5 - Rabbinic Perspectives Cosmic vs Conditional

I will not go into a full treatment here of the multiple opinions, but I've found people seem genuinely shocked when I cite the opinion of the Shulhan Aruch, a usually acceptable source which in this case is relatively lenient compared to other opinions or conventional understanding.

First, here is the relevant source:

שולחן ערוך יורה דעה הלכות בשר בחלב סימן צה
סעיף ג
קערות של בשר שהודחו ביורה חולבת בחמין שהיד סולדת בהן, אפילו שניהם בני יומן, מותר, משום דהוה ליה נותן טעם בר נותן טעם דהתירא. והוא שיאמר ברי לי שלא היה שום שומן דבוק בהן. ואם היה שומן דבוק בהן, צריך שיהא במים ס' כנגד ממשות שומן שעל פי הקערה.

סעיף ד
יראה לי שאם נתנו אפר במים חמין שביורה קודם שהניחו הקדירות בתוכה, אף על פי שהשומן דבוק בהן, מותר, דעל ידי האפר הוא נותן טעם לפגם

Shulhan Aruch Yoreh Deah 95:3-4
Meat plates washed in a dairy cauldron, hot enough such that one's hand burns (the halakhic temperature for absorbency), even if both had been used within one day, it is permitted because it is gives a secondary tasting (noten ta'am bar noten ta'am, too much to detail here). And this is where he says I am certain that there is no fat stuck to the plate, and if there was meat fat stuck, then there must be 60 parts water in the pot compared to the meat fat [such that it would be nullified in batel beshishim]

It seems to me that if one put ashes in the hot water in the pot before one put in the pot, even though there is fat stuck it is permitted because the ashes will ruin the taste.

Kashrut follows a principle of ta'am k'ikar, meaning even the taste of an item (e.g. meat, or a non-kosher food) is equivalent to the item itself, and there are numerous laws regarding how "taste" can transfer. However, if the item in question would be notein ta'am lifgam - give over its taste to detriment i.e. an undesirable addition - then the taste in question would not halakhically absorb. I know it may sound confusing, but this is the best I can summarize Yoreh Deah in a paragraph.¹

According to the Shulhan Aruch cited above, the addition of "ashes" to a pot of hot water is sufficient to mitigate the taste transference from meat dishes to dairy dishes, even when there is actual residual meat fat stuck to the dish itself. Today we do not use ashes but dishwasher detergent which I suspect also ruins any leftover food such as to make it inedible. Therefore, for the Shulhan Aruch it would be permissible to wash meat and dairy dishes in the same dishwasher at the same time. Furthermore, operating on the very reasonable assumption that dishwashers are only run with some form of detergent, there would be no need to kasher a dishwasher if it has been previously used for non-kosher dishes.

This is not to say the Shulhan Aruch is the only opinion regarding dishwashers - some are more stringent and others are lenient for other/additional reasons.²

However, it is still useful to know it exists, and useful for me to have a direct link.

Fundamentals of Judaism 4 - What God Wants Sources (PDF)

Fundamentals of Judaism 4 - What God Wants

Confronting Chosenness 4 - Jews and Non-Jews in the Bible Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 4 - Jews and Non-Jews in the Bible

Greenberg assisted Bock and Kaplan in creating a ceremonial text that reflected the uniqueness of the event while incorporating the traditional elements of a Jewish wedding. Those familiar with the latter would have noticed an alteration in many of the texts, including the changing of genders for several of the pronouns. "Harey at mekudeshet li," or "Behold, you (female) are consecrated to me" thus became "Harey atah m’kudash li," or "Behold, you (male) are consecrated to me."

While the news article emphasizes Rabbi Greenberg's credentials as holding an Orthodox ordination, the Orthodox world has repudiated the religious legitimization, let alone officiating, same-sex marriages. Even the recent Statement of Principles, an important template for integrating and including homosexuals in an Orthodox community, specifically excludes same-sex marriages:

11. Halakhic Judaism cannot give its blessing and imprimatur to Jewish religious same-sex commitment ceremonies and weddings, and halakhic values proscribe individuals and communities from encouraging practices that grant religious legitimacy to gay marriage and couplehood

Still, those accustomed to halakhic debates may contest this point. After all, the Bible only explicitly prohibits sexual relations between men. Marriage, on the other hand, may be construed as a ceremony of love or commitment, and does not necessarily imply that the couple would in fact engage in halakhicallyprohibited sexual activity.¹
To some, this argument may seem like halakhic hairsplitting to achieve a desired result, but the underlying assumption is crucial to the halakhic process. In order to assert that an action is prohibited in Jewish law, one must provide textual evidence from Biblical or Rabbinic sources to demonstrate how the action in question would be either Biblically or Rabbinically prohibited based on existing halakhic interpretation or legislation.

I submit that Jewish law does in fact prohibit same-sex marriage ceremonies, and does so explicitly.

When the Jewish people were still travelling in the desert, they were warned not to copy the practices, or more literally "statutes," of either the Egyptians or Canaanites. Leviticus 18:3 states:

כְּמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם אֲשֶׁר יְשַׁבְתֶּם בָּהּ לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ וּכְמַעֲשֵׂה אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מֵבִיא אֶתְכֶם שָׁמָּה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם לֹא תֵלֵכוּ:

After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do; and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do; neither shall ye walk in their statutes

The chapter continues enumerating prohibited sexual relations including the prohibition regarding gay sex in 18:22. However the idiom "וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם לֹא תֵלֵכוּ" – following their statutes – is general prohibition, which unsurprisingly is addressed in rabbinic literature.

In the rabbinic text Sifra Achrei Mot 9:8 we find the following exposition:

לא אמרתי אלא בחוקים החקוקים להם ולאבותיהם ולאבות אבותיהם ומה היו עושים האיש נושא לאיש והאשה לאשה, האיש נושא אשה ובתה והאשה ניסת לשנים לכך נאמר ובחקותיהם לא תלכו.

I did not say this [prohibition] except for the statutes enacted by them, their fathers, and their father's fathers. And what would they do? A man would marry a man, a woman [would marry] a woman, a man would marry a woman and her daughter, and a woman would marry two men. Therefore it says, "and in their statutes do not follow."

This text of the Sifra is a halakhic midrash, which is to say legal exegesis with the effect of determining normative Jewish law.² According to this Rabbinic source, the specific actions prohibited by Lev. 18:3 include the men marrying men and women marrying women.

It is important to clarify that the word "נשא" or "marry" does not imply that the union has any halakhic validity. All marriages (נשואין) must be preceded by a formal declaration of an intent to marry called kiddushin (קדושין). Not only must this act of kiddushin be between a man and a woman, but the relations between these two individuals must not be prohibited by Jewish law, otherwise the act of kiddushin is meaningless (B. Yevamot 53a, Rambm Ishut 4:12).³ It is thus my understanding of Sifra Achrei Mot 9:8 that the prohibition does not refer to any halakhically binding marriage, but rather any equivalent or comparably ceremony and by extension any formal union would violate the prohibition of "וּבְחֻקֹּתֵיהֶם לֹא תֵלֵכוּ" - not following in their (i.e. the Egyptian or Canaanite) statutes.

This midrash is not contradicted in later rabbinic sources, and indeed it does not reappear except for inclusion in later midrashic compilations, though it does appear sporadically in later halakhic codes such as Rambam Issurei Biah 22:8 and Vilna Gaon in Biur HaGra EH 20:11.

I would argue that this omission is not indicative of a rejection of the midrashic law, but if anything, indicates that for various reasons the sages deemed it obvious, superfluous, and unnecessary to repeat or include. Consider that homosexuality was not a practical concern for the rabbinic sages. While they enacted the laws of yichud prohibiting seclusion of individuals who are 'arayot (people with whom relations are forbidden), they intentionally made no such decree for two men on the grounds that Jewish men are not suspect of homosexuality (B. Kiddushin 82a). It is also conceivable that codifiers of halakhah considered the marriage to be an obvious extension from the prohibited relationship. In other words, they may not have sufficiently distinguished between commitment ceremonies and the forbidden sexual relationships implied therein. Not only would these ceremonies be considered an anomalous rarity, but they could easily be implicitly subscribed under the prohibitions of sexual activity.

As such, regardless of how Jewish communities accommodate the needs of gays in their respective communities, the formal recognition of a homosexual marriage - male or female - would in fact be condoning a halakhicaly prohibited union, regardless of the private behaviors of the individuals. It would therefore follow that Rabbis who are committed to halakha should therefore not officiate or participate in these ceremonies, nor should halakhic communities formally recognize the couple as such, as they would with any other union prohibited by Jewish law.

This is not to negate any of the other points of the aforementioned Statement of Principles, which I should note I personally signed. But it is important to remember that for shomrei Torah the boundaries of pluralism must always be defined by the arba amot of halakhah - the four cubits of Jewish Law.

Fundamentals of Judaism 3 - God in the Torah Sources (PDF)

Fundamentals of Judaism 3 - God in the Torah

Confronting Chosenness 3 - Breaking the Covenant Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 3 - Breaking the Covenant

Fundamentals of Judaism 2 - God and Torah Sources (PDF)

Fundamentals of Judaism 2 - God and Torah

Confronting Chosenness 2 - Biblical Covenants Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 2 - Biblical Covenants

Fundamentals of Judaism 1 - Introduction

Confronting Chosenness 1 - Biblical Foundations Sources (PDF)

Confronting Chosenness 1 - Biblical Foundations

As such, this class incorporates halakha (Jewish Law), machshava (Jewish theology), Jewish history, psychology, and sociology. In response to demand I started recording and podcasting these classes, though only beginning to do so in January of 2011 (missing the classes on Biblical and Rabbinic examples).

For those who missed any classes or wish to review, these are the links in sequential order of the podcasts currently online. The posts themselves contain the audio recordings of the classes as well as PDF's of the source sheets used.

On a personal note, I am grateful for the opportunity to have been able to teach such a class and I found the entire experience immensely gratifying. I hope you find these classes informative and intellectually stimulating, and I welcome all questions and feedback.

Enjoy!

1. Rambam and Rebellion
2. Rambam on Tzadok and Baitus
3. Rambam and Separating from the Community
4. Rambam on Leadership by Fear and Rambam on Repentance
5. Versus Rambam - Opposition to Maimonides
6. Hasidim vs. Mitnagdim
7. David Berger Vs. Chabad Lubavitch
8. Sephardim vs. Ashkenazim
9. Nodeh Beyehuda and R. Yaakov Emden
10. Hatam Sofer
11. R. Akiva Eger
12. R. Jacob Ettlinger and Hierarchical Judaism
13. The Birth of Conservative Judaism
14. R. Moshe Feinstein vs. Conservative and Reform Part 1
15. R. Moshe Feinstein vs. Conservative and Reform Weddings
16. R. Moshe Feinstein on Conservative Conversions
17. R. Moshe Feinstein on Non-Observant Jews
18. Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox Part 1
19. Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox Part 2
20. Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox Part 3
21. Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox Part 4
22. Preserving Gender Roles Part 1 – Mechitzah
23. Preserving Gender Roles Part 2 – Women Rabbis
24. Conclusion and Summary

Politics of Exclusion - Conclusion and Summary

Preserving Gender Roles 2 - Women Rabbis Sources (PDF)

Preserving Gender Roles 2 - Women Rabbis

Consider one such example from the liturgy. In the section of morning blessings, the same part of the service which includes shelo asani isha - virtually all sidduim contain the blessing ha-notein la'ya'ef koach - blessing God for giving strength to the weak. R. Yosef Karo (1488-1575) opposed not only the recitation of this blessing (O.H. 46:6), but the legitimacy of its very existence stating, "since it is not mentioned in the Talmud, I do not know how this person had permission to create it" (Beit Yosef O.H. 46:6). The difference between omitting a blessing and reciting an unauthorized one is substantial; in the former one only does not fulfill a rabbinic obligation (T. Berachot 6:18) but in the latter instance one violates a biblical prohibition of taking God's name in vain (Shemot 20:6, B. Berachot 33a). And yet for contemporary Judaism, one such liturgical change is accepted if not required, while the other is deemed unorthodox.

The methods of how Orthodox Judaism selectively incorporates or rejects changes is beyond the scope of this essay. However, there is a more fundamental question which can be extremely uncomfortable for most traditional Orthodox Jews: are the boundaries and definitions for acceptable Orthodox Judaism objective or subjective? Based on the sanctimony emanating from Orthodox Judaism it would be reasonable to assume the former. But if there are objective criteria for Orthodox Judaism, then this criteria must not only be defined and defended explicitly, but more importantly applied consistently to every instance. This would mean that even well established "traditional" opinions or rabbis who violate this criteria would have to be held accountable to this standard, and perhaps be reconsidered as beyond the scope of Orthodox Judaism.

On the other hand, if the criteria for Orthodox Judaism is subjective, meaning it is a floating target meant to include or exclude as a need arises, then Orthodox Judaism is as arbitrary as the other denominations which they criticize. Despite the rhetoric of preserving Torah, if the criteria is subjective, then Orthodox Judaism is so only because its adherents say so.

To paraphrase John Adams, the question which Orthodox Jews must inevitably confront is if it is a religion of laws or of men. If the former, then the laws must be applied universally to exclude that which violates it and to accept that which falls within its range of acceptability, regardless of a an individual's stature or affiliation. But if Orthodox Judaism is primarily defined by its community then the arbitrariness would be justified, albeit at the expense of its alleged adherence to being shomerei torah.

This question must be addressed by anyone who ventures into the debate as to what qualifies as "Orthodox Judaism." But from my own experience I have found that the Law provides its own answer and the Men provide theirs.

Preserving Gender Roles 1 - Mechitzah Sources (PDF)

Preserving Gender Roles 1 - Mechitzah

While I have no expectations of resolving this divisive issue, I do hope to explicate the rationales implied when one invokes a gadol, and why others may find such an argument unconvincing.

In order to participate in an intelligible or meaningful debate, opposing sides must accept certain mutually agreed upon assumptions or premises relevant to the discussion at hand. This prerequisite can be particularly challenging in religious debates where the logical foundations are not based in empirical fact as much as one's subjective faith, though such statements of faith are often presented as fact. Thus if only one side assumes an idea as a religious truism, the conversation will quickly deteriorate into personal attacks on the other's religious integrity.

To illustrate this distinction between "fact" and "faith," consider an instance where one cites a passage in the Talmud to support a halakhic or theological position. Whether or not the passage appears in the Talmud is a matter of "fact" which one can easily verify by looking up the citation in the Talmud. However the significance of that passage - i.e. the degree to which it is determines normative Jewish thought or practice - is a subjective matter of "faith" Often based on one's tradition. For example, according to Maimonides the Talmud is final authority in determining the universally obligatory or prohibited laws for all halakhic process (Introduction to Mishnah Torah). For others popular practice takes an equal if not superior role in determining halakha, as demonstrated in the idiom "the custom of Israel is Torah" (Ramban Commentary to Pesachim 7b). Today it is not uncommon to hear from Orthodox rabbis, "we don't pasken from the gemara." To some degree the fact/faith dichotomy is at the core of any argument in which one invokes a "gadol" to support a position in an argument.

The term "gadol" means "great one" or more specifically a "great rabbi," whose opinions because of his greatness, are treated not only as superior to those of ordinary rabbis (let alone common Jews) but may also be considered to be the definitive religious position on any given subject. Similarly, its plural form "gedolim" refers to a collective of great rabbis, which in addition to the implication of rabbinic greatness, also conveys the perception of consensus among the religious elite. Thus, when one invokes a gadol or attributes a stated position to a gadol or the gedolim, he is not only appealing to the higher authority in support of a position as much as arguing that the gadol's affirmation itself determines the correct Jewish position. Conversely, any position which contradicts or criticizes a gadol or the gedolim on matters of halakha, theology, or even public policy is inherently illegitimate if not an outright heretical affront to the Jewish religion or even God's will. In either case, any position contrary to that of a gadol is summarily dismissed purely on the authority of the elite rabbinic persona.

Appeals to a gadol and gedolim are primarily predicated on two categorical assumptions of faith.¹ The first set of assumptions are ontological, in that there does in fact exist within Judaism an elite class with the final authority over legal, theological, and public policy questions to which all Jews must adhere and all lesser rabbis must defer. It is important to distinguish this elite class from the Sanhedrin which was a formal judicial and legislative body with its own qualifications, procedures, and regulations. Even if the other party in the argument agrees that certain rabbis are greater in some way than others, he may not necessarily bestow upon those rabbis the superior authority implied by the designation of "gadol."

The primary obstacle with this assumption is that it is nearly impossible to verify or reject without similar assumptions of faith regarding the source(s) of religious authority in Judaism. Were one to support the existence of such an authoritative informal institution, one must provide some basis to justify that position. One such option would be to find supporting (or opposing) sources in Jewish texts such as the Bible or Talmud. However, even if these sources are considered part of the religious canon, their respective authority may be disputed and their meanings reinterpreted. In the Talmud itself we find differing opinions relating to the legal normativity of the books of the Prophets,² and the Rabbinic sages often reinterpreted Biblical verses outside of their literal meaning - the most famous example of which being Ex. 21:24 "an eye for an eye" to mean a monetary penalty (B. Bava Kamma 83b-84a). Finally, as noted above, even the normative role of the Talmud is disputed among Orthodox traditions, not to mention the authority of interpreting Talmudic sources.

In other words, the very question of religious authority in Judaism requires a priori assumptions of faith regarding the very sources of religious authority with which to justify one's position. After all, rabbinic authority is defined by the Rabbis, and the gadol’s authority would only be validated through the authority of other great rabbis, even those of an earlier era. The authority of any institution must come from some place outside of itself, and unless that source of validation is agreed upon a priori, the question of any authority is never answered, only deferred. Therefore, arguments for the existance of an authoritative gadol class through Jewish texts will not result in definitive conclusions.

And yet, if the existence and authority of an elite rabbinic class is granted, the second set of assumptions which need to be addressed relate to its membership. In particular, two questions which must be answered are 1. who is considered to be a gadol or among the gedolim and 2. what is the criteria by which one makes those determinations. Rarely (if ever) will an individual rabbi declare himself to be a gadol - such a declaration would be not only the mark of arrogance but blatantly self serving. Thus membership in the gadol class must come from an outside source.

Given the elite status of the gadol one may suspect that only one who has attained this elite status could in turn bestow it upon others. Rabbis can only be ordained by other Rabbis, members of the Sanhedrin appoint their own colleagues. To attain a high rank, one suspects the authority must derive from an equal or higher authority. However, there is no such formal mechanism of meritocracy for gedolim. There is no formal election, recognition, or proclamation indicating when a rabbi has achieved greatness. Thus, despite the magnified importance and authority attributed to the gedolim, there is no objective criteria to identify or define them.³

None of this is to argue that great rabbis do not exist. Every field of knowledge has it experts, and indeed, some may argue that similar to other areas of knowledge the gedolim are the recognized authorities in their field such that their opinions ought to carry greater significance. In other words, even if deference to gedolim is not mandated by Jewish texts it should still be expected by dint of the gedolim's superior expertise.

However, there are three important differences between the expertise of secular scholars and gedolim and the expectations in relating to that expertise. First, there are important differences in how such expertise is determined. Usually this is measured in terms of the academic output of publications or contributions to a field, except that each field has its own criteria for evaluating the quality of another's work. Works in the sciences or social sciences must include a section on methodology - how is data collected and why were those conditions valid (if not optimal) for collecting data. In the humanities where there is more subjectivity, scholars not only justify the veracity of their claims or interpretation, but in many cases must justify the very existence of their scholarship. After all, who needs another essay on Hamlet.

As noted above, there no objective criteria by which to similarly evaluate the expertise and contributions of gedolim. In fact I would argue that this is by design. Secular experts seek to convince others of the validity and importance of their research, and so much meet certain formalistic requirements evaluated by peer review. But gedolim by definition of their elite status could only be properly vetted by other gedolim. Gedolim have no need to convince others of the correctness of their positions when those others lack the stature to use their own judgements.

Along these lines, the second difference between secular experts and gedolim is the expectation of obedience. Unless one is a university student dependant on GPA or a PhD advisor's approval, there are no practical negative consequences for rejecting any expert's theory. Even an expert's devotees cannot expect to attract followers if they simply demand obsequiousness to their chosen mentor. On the other hand, a gadol is responsible for determining Jewish law, in which case his word becomes the law itself - which all Orthodox Jews must ostensibly follow. Due to this religious authority, it is not surprising for gedolim to attract a cult like following who will in turn attempt to get others to follow the gadol's authority because after all, the religion commands it.

The third difference between secular experts and gedolim is also perhaps the source of the most of the controversies in Judaism. Specifically, what are the expectations when one speaks beyond their respective fields of expertise? Secular experts rarely venture beyond their training if they have not done appropriate research, and if they do, there are usually well defined rules of engagement for making a persuasive case. But gedolim frequently issue proclamations affecting public policies of economics, bioethics,⁴ criminology, or international and local politics. Instead of acknowledging that perhaps a gadol may contradict actual experts, supporters may argue epistemologically that all knowledge is encoded in the Torah, such that an expert in Torah is automatically an expert in all fields of knowledge. But this too is ultimately an assumption of faith, not fact.

One final point which must be mentioned is that not all references to gedolim follow this pattern. It is difficult to discuss contemporary Jewish law without at least consulting with the works of R. Moshe Feinstein or R. Ovadia Yosef, both of whom are considered gedolim even beyond their immediate constituency. Yet, not everyone who cites these undeniably influential sages does so with the expectation that their positions must be normative law binding on all Jews. The distinction between citing an invoking a gadol is in the expectation of unquestioning deference to the gadol's position.

In conclusion, despite any pretense of a logical rational argument, most appeals to gedolim in religious arguments are not intended to advance a discussion but to end it through the imposition of one's faith, or at least several components thereof. And as with most arguments of faith, it is usually a pointless exercise to counter argue on those terms. In this regard Dr. Hertzberg was correct in coining the term "gadolatry" - not in the sense that those who follow gedolim are idolaters, but in the minds of a non-trival segment of the Jewish population, when one disputes the sacred authority of a gadol, he might as well argue with God himself.

Politics of Exclusion - Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox 4 Sources (PDF)

Politics of Exclusion - Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox Part 4

Politics of Exclusion - Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox 3 Sources (PDF)
Politics of Exclusion - Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox Part 3

This year's birthday post will probably be an improvement over last year's, which in retrospect was kind of depressing. To be sure, it reflected where I was at the time and if anything conveyed a sense of forced optimism. While today I don't feel a sense of enthusiams or exhilaration, I can honestly say I'm much calmer - perhaps even using the term "stable."

The funny thing is that nothing specific happened this past year to account for any significant change in mood. Of the two major life issues of family and career there has been little progress if not outright setbacks; my fultile experiences in blind dating are now well documented and I faced the disappointment of not getting into PhD programs.

So what happened?

My best guess is that while in the past I've tended to obsess about the "big questions," this year I've been working on handling the smaller, immediate, and more controllable issues which come up every day. Instead of viewing each decision as an immensely important life defining choice, I realize while all actions have repurcussions few result in the dire consequneces I would sometimes imagine. It's not that things aren't important anymore, it's just that I'm seeing things from a new perspective.

In short, I think I've mellowed in my old age.

I'm only partially joking here. Despite what the AARP thinks, I know that 34 isn't really "old" (though I suppose it's relative). But I do think that at 34¹ I'm starting to approach life differently. It's not that I don't have priorities, goals, or dreams,² but I am reevaluating exactly how to accomplish them and manage the inevitable disappointments, keeping in mind that life is much bigger than anything I can imagine.

I have no idea how long this new attiude will last or if it will help result in any of the meaningful changes to which I still aspire, but I can guess that I'm going to find the process much more enjoyable.

And of course, I have my friends and Loyal Readers along for the ride.