Recently in Random Acts of Scholarship Category

Taking advantage of the recent national holidays I gave a two-part shiur series at The Stanton St. Shul. Part 1 was given on December 25th (fourth day of Hanukah) on Rabbinic Responses to Greek Culture and Part 2 was delivered this morning on Rabbinic Responses to Christian Thought. (The initial plan was to combine both into one shiur, but that was unrealistic).

I'm not writing them up because to be perfectly honest most of what I did was done before, and much better than I could ever hope to do. In particular I borrowed heavily from Saul Lieberman's Greek in Jewish Palestine / Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, Ephraim Urbach's The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, and Haham Jose' Faur's new book The Horizontal Society which I hope to review shortly.

Still there are those who may be interested in the source sheets, which may be downloaded in PDF:
Rabbinic Reactions to Greek Culture
Rabbinic Responses to Christian Thought.

Also, I'm going to be posting future source sheets - and slowly migrating old ones - to a new section of YUTOPIA: http://joshyuter.com/shiurim/

Enjoy!

A few weeks ago I received the relieving news that my master's thesis from the University of Chicago finally passed after several years and several attempts. The approved version was actually a draft and needed some degree of editing for typos, grammar, and a few structural changes. After mulling it over for a while and getting some positive feedback I've decided to post the thesis here with a few explanations.

While there is no shortage of Benei Yisrael being rebuked in Tanach for their various transgressions, one such indictment which seems imprecise and perhaps overly harsh is the comparison with the people of S'dom and 'Amorah. As we know, the legacy of S'dom and 'Amorah is one of unmitigated evil and a benchmark for immorality which is used to this day. Their sins were so complete and evil so absolute that Hashem does not simply cause the cities' destruction, but completely obliterates them with unparalleled divine wrath. And yet in Eicha we are told that "the sins of the daughter of my people is greater than that of S'dom" (Eicha 4:6), and in the Haftara of Hazon the Navi exclaims "Heed the word of Hashem you leaders of S'dom, listen to the words of our God's Torah you people of 'Amorah" (Yeshayahu 1:10). Were the sins of the Jews in fact as serious and complete to warrant such comparisons with S'dom and 'Amorah?

If you ever find yourself in an intellectual discussion, you might hear (or yourself use) the term "slippery slope argument." The general logic behind a "slippery slope" argument is that if we allow X, then Y would be the inevitable consequence. Since Y is obviously bad, then we shouldn't allow X. The main flaws of this logic would be irrationally assigning an extreme value to Y or by not demonstrating how X -> Y. Opponents of "slippery slopes" rarely argue the merits or demerits of the argument but instead chose to redefine the logic as it suits them. Since the reformulation is usually flawed, opponents may then use the derisive "slippery slope" label to easily discount opposing positions.

Some site maintenance pointed me to Zachary Sholem Berger's response to my review of Rabbi Steve Greenberg's book. Berger's first contention is that my position "smacks of the slippery slope argument used against same-sex marriage."

If gays can marry, why not polygamy? or incest? or bestiality? The idea, I suppose, is that homosexuality is basically the same thing as everything else outside the bounds of traditional understanding, and homosexuality is traditionally condemned for the same reason as these other activities. Neither of these is true. The same can be said of ones: homosexuality is different from adultery and murder, I should think, in important ways - namely that homosexuality is not, a priori, immoral, while adultery breaches a relationship and murder takes life.

Here, Berger imposes the issue of morality on my legal argument. His equation compares same-sex marriage with murder on moral grounds. Since there is a moral distinction between them, the laws should obviously be different. However, my critique of R. Greenberg was not based on morality, but on halakhic or legal reasoning. The difference is that laws are not abstract, but they are the rules for normative behavior to which all society must (or at least should) adhere. Jurists from the Talmud through the American Supreme Court have concerned themselves with interpreting law not only for the immediate case at hand, but also the ramifications for future cases.

In the example of oness, R. Greenberg argued that since homosexuals are born with the desire, then we should treat them in the legal category of being exempt if they commit a biblical prohibition. However, if the mere innate desire is sufficient to exempt one type of sin, then the logical consequence would be to apply that logic to other desires as well. Once all desires are outside of one's control, then all transgressions may be dismissed. This is not an issue of what is moral or immoral, but of the ramifications of assigning legal categories.

Similarly, the secular debate of homosexual marriage may be phrased in legal terms as well. Does the government have a legal right to legislate the private sexual actions of consenting individuals? If the government does, then technically, it could have the power to outlaw homosexual unions. If it does not, then by what legal right does it have to prohibit other sexual acts, such as statutory rape based on an arbitrarily decided age of consent? True, many are motivated by moral concerns, but the legal issues must still be addressed.

The other general problem I see with the immediate rejection of slippery slope arguments is the intrinsic inconsistency. Most logical arguments I have seen follow the logic of IF X THEN Y, including those positions taken by those who oppose the slippery slope arguments. For example, Berger concludes, "As a liberal Jew, however, I do sometimes feel like a passenger on a cruise ship, who asks himself, 'How much longer do we have to be swinging right on this thing?'" To which I counter, what is wrong with "swinging right" on this or any issue? Furthermore, why shouldn't we be able to discriminate against whomever we chose? If your answer would follow the logic of IF we did that THEN something would happen, you've just set up a slippery slope argument.

This is not to say that all slippery slope arguments are valid - some are clearly far fetched. However, each one must be taken at its merits and debated as it is formulated, and not as one decides to interpret them. I find it ironic that "slippery slope" arguments are often rejected because of their misleading logic, and so they are dismissed automatically based on equally misleading logic.

Berger's other issue deals more with the question of halakhic authority, one which I cannot detail yet at this point. However, I think it's time for me to just write a general summary of how Jewish Law works, or at least the concepts and rationale for why I believe what I believe.

Homosexuality and Orthodox Judaism

A few months ago, Avraham pointed me to this Forward review of Rabbi Steve Greenberg's new book Wrestling with God and Men. I wrote some preliminary thoughts based on the review, but the YUCS server crashed as I submitted it for posting. This technical glitch proved to be fortuitous in that Rabbi Greenberg visited UC later that week and I was able to talk to him personally and purchase a copy of the book. Although he still did not convince me of his arguments, he conveyed the emotional turmoil with which people live. In halakhic matters, people often ignore the human dimension involved of an issue and develop their opinions in a social vacuum. However, halakha is ultimately followed by people many of whom face difficult conflicts for a myriad of personal reasons. While personal issues alone are not sufficient to change Jewish law, we cannot ignore the tension and struggles that people face in their quest to be observant Jews.

Below is my review of Rabbi Greenberg's book, as submitted to a writing seminar.

Recently, I submitted a paper for a class titled "Theology and Mythology of Evil." The class read texts from several cultures and religions, each attempting to resolve how Evil could exist, especially in a world of an omniscient and beneficent God (or Gods as the case may be).

I noticed in the class a tendency for people to assume that there exists a particular "Jewish" attitude regarding Evil. Although this is true to some extent, the overall perception mirrors the attitude of the yeshiva - that one or two opinions believed by Jews makes the opinion "Jewish" - to the possible exclusion of everything else.

This attitude is precisely what prompted me to start the Mahshevet Hazal shiurim. With this in mind, I collected several sources from the Talmud which illustrate the plurality of opinions regarding the problem of theodicy. While retaining the multiple and often mutually exclusive positions in the Talmud, I offered my suggestions for a unified Rabbinic approach to Evil.

It's time now for my response to Rabbi Daniel Stein. Sorry for the delays, but I do have schoolwork to do here. I've been working on a response that will adequately address R. Stein's points, while not succumbing to ranting. As comical and entertaining as a Grach-type review would be, I feel that R. Stein's article deserves a serious analysis and critique.

(Rants may come at the end)

Although the MAPPS program offers unparalleled academic freedom, the directors of my program require one particular survey class, "Perspectives in Social Science Analysis." Over the 10 week quarter, Dr. John MacAloon and various other professors present 9 different perspectives with Dr. MacAloon presenting an overview and another scholar discussing contemporary applications of that perspective.

In week 8, we covered "Structuralism,"¹ and I was surprised to see the similarities between this perspective and " lomdus" - specifically the Brisker Derekh. There are several decent summaries of Structuralism on the web and some more on one of its main advocates Claude Lévi-Strauss.²

For those too lazy to click the links or God forbid do your own research, I'll give you the short attention span summary.⁴ Lévi-Strauss, an anthropologist, utilized aspects of linguistic theory to interpret social phenomenon beyond language.³ Linguists, like Saussure, distinguished between the words used in language and the effect, the symbol and the meaning, the langue and the parolé. How did they do this? After analyzing how speech works throughout all cultures, they realized that some phenomenon repeated themselves and they explained the different phenomenon through polar binary opposites.

Lévi-Strauss applied this methodology to social phenomenon like myths. In his work The Structural Study of Myth, Lévi-Strauss demonstrates that the Oedipus myth contains elements found in myths from other cultures. He identifies the patterns by breaking down the myth into atomic elements, and "re-structures" these elements into classifications. Once Lévi-Strauss classifies these elements into categories, he then uses his categorization to compare the Oedipus myth with similar myths. Although the categories are arbitrary, Structuralists like to formulate categories in binary opposites. E.g. symbol and meaning, personal and communal, etc.

How is this like the Brisker Derekh? Unfortunately, there isn't much directly written on the methodology of how to do "Brisk."⁵ However, I picked up a few things from my numerous years in yeshiva, and I can say that the analytical methodology is similar - though perhaps not identical.

Like structuralists, Briskers tend to explain several sources and rulings though binary comparisons. Some popular ones are heftza (object) and gavra (person), shem (name) and halos (legal status), mitzvah hiyuvi (obligatory commandment) and mitzvah kiyyumi (fulfilling a commandment), or simply "qualitative" and "quantitative" differences. Although this might apply to other areas of "lomdus" I've noticed that Briskers tend toward the binary opposites more than others. Just about every shiur I can remember from Gush involved a two-way mahloket and tannaim, amoraim, rishonim, and achronim neatly fitting into one of two arbitrary abstract categories.

Some Briskers also apply this perspective to areas of Jewish Thought. R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, perhaps the most famous descendant of the "Brisker Rav" and his tradition. In "The Lonely Man of Faith, R. Soloveitchik contrasts the personalities and religious attitudres of "Adam One" and "Adam Two" from the creation narratives. Elsewhere, R. Soloveitchik's rational "Halakhic Man" stands in opposition to the more emotional "Homo-Religiosus." Again, his thought leads him to present theological and religious ideas through manufactured binary oppositions.

Methodologically, Briskers construct and categorize the concepts in ways similar to the structuralists. Specifically, they first remove the sugya from the original context of the gemara. The sugya becomes the unit of analysis as opposed to a chapter, or even a page of talmud. Consequently, Briskers will not concern themselves with literary analysis or even finding the correct version of the talmud,⁶ because the details are not as important as the structure or the concepts. Like structuralism, these concepts are arbitrary and subject to the whim of the scholar. Unlike structuralism, yeshivas have canonized the scholars i.e. the rabbis, and therefore artificial structures become sacred and part of the "tradition."⁷

I am not surprised that the Brisker Derekh attracts so many followers, nor am I surprised at the criticisms. Structuralism can be useful, and often it may be the best method for explaining a particular data set. Critics, however, will note that as a standalone system - as an "ism" if you will - structuralism assumes and imposes too much on the data. Furthermore, in the social sciences critics will complain that structuralists remove the human participants from the analysis. Social interaction becomes a bloodless game of abstract categories with no attention to human emotions. Similarly, critics of the Brisker Derekh deride the lack of attention to detail of the sugya in its original context. Literary approaches and historical evidence may often contradict the structures imposed on the text of the talmud.

I am not going to speculate on who got what from whom. Lévi-Strauss was born and raised Jewish, and it's likely his background influenced his scholarship. I also don't think I'm saying anything radical or new here, it's just an interesting similarity I noticed in class. Take it as you will.

1. Unfortunately, the laptop was in limbo then, so I don't have typed notes from the lectures.
2. Not to be confused with the guy who made jeans.
3. See Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology
4. I.e. don't cite this description for anything useful.
5. When I was in Gush, a small book called "The Brisker Derekh" came out and it was pretty close to a "How To Brisk." As I recall, most of the ramim and students dismissed the book as too simplistic, which was probably as good of an endorsement as it could get. At any rate, I can't find a link to it on the web.
6. The standard "Vilna" edition is loaded with errors. See Dikdukei Soferim or the Lieberman Project for other versions of the Talmud Bavli - and manuscript work is ongoing. If this sounds too heretical for you, consider that a passage may appear in several places throughout rabbinic literature (Bavli, Yerushalmi, Tosefta, Mishna, Midrash Halakha...), but there will be significant changes in their presentation. See for example, Dr. Elman's Authority and Tradition and many, many, other works.
7. For some ramifications in education, see Hakirah or Mehkar: The Religious Implications of an Historical Approach to Limmudei Kodesh by Rachel Furst and Mosheh Lichtenstein, "What Hath Brisk Wrought: The Brisker Derekh Revisited" Torah U-Madda Journal, volume 9, 1-18, 2000.

I've made some veiled references to "Theorizing Judaism." I've recently completed Dr. Martin Risebrodt's class, Theorizing Religion. Unlike typical survey classes, Dr. Riesebrodt used this class as feedback for his currently unpublished book on religion. Dr. Riesebrodt would present his ideas and one class a week would be a discussion. After he presented the main points of his thesis, the students presented examples from specific religions which may or may not have supported his thesis. In addition, we were to submit two written essays discussing the merits and flaws of his thesis. The following post will explain his thesis, and my applications of the thesis to Judaism.

A Not So Divine Comedy

Probably the most annoying part of attempting an ethnography of the CRC is the 2 hour commute (each way) via public transportation. On the other hand, I get to catch up on light reading. Today's entertainment comes from Rabbinic Fantasies a collection of midrashim ranging from the Rabbinic Period through R. Nachman. Specifically, I was reading about the "Alphabet of Ben Sira" which is best known for giving us the midrash of Lilith. (And not to be confused with the apocryphal book The Wisdom of Ben Sira).

It's a real shame this isn't taught in Yeshivot - this stuff is off the charts on the unintentional comedy scale. According to the book, Ben Sira was the son of Yirmayahu and his daughter, though not through incestuous means. (I'd elaborate, but this is a family blog). At any rate, Ben Sira was born with a full set of teeth, the intelligence of an adult, and the personality of Stewie from Family Guy.

I quote from pages 171-172:

"My son," said his mother to Ben Sira, "don't speak for the evil eye may fix its power on you."
"The evil eye has no authority over me. Besides, do not try to talk me out of doing what my father did. To me applies the proverb, 'The ewe takes after the ewe, and the son follows the deeds of his father.'"
"Why do you interrupt me my son?" his mother asked.
"Because you know that I'm hungry, and you give me nothing to eat."
"Here, take my breasts. Eat and drink."
"I have no desire for your breasts. Go sift flour in a vessel, knead it into fine bread, and get fatty meat and aged wine - and you can eat with me."

Awfully precocious for an infant, no? Just wait until he gets to school:

Said the teacher, "You cannot be taught, for you are still too young. Our sages of blessed memory stated, 'at the age of five years a child begins to study Bible.' (Mishna Avot 5:24)"
"But have you not learned," Ben Sira asked, "The day is short, but the work is great' (Mishna Avot 2:20)? And you tell me to sit and not to study because I am too young! In the cemetery I can see children younger than I who are dead. Who knows what will be, whether I shall live or die?"
The teacher retorted, "How dare you instruct me! Our sages of blessed memory declared, 'Whoever teaches the law in the presence of his teacher is deserving of death' (B. Berakhot 31b)."
Ben Sira replied, "You are not yet my teacher, for so far I have learned nothing from you."

So, you might be wondering, what would a child like this be when he grows up? Well, later in his life he had an audience with Nebuchadnezzar (how he got there is an amusing story in its own right) and explained to him the answers of such philosophical questions as:

• Why were farts created? (Ben Sira also cured Nebuchadnezzar's daughter who had a thousand every hour. And you thought I had a hard time dating)


• Why does the ox not have hair under its nose?


• Why does the cat eat the mouse and not other rodents?


• Why are the cat and dog enemies? (Thus explaining the history of cartoons in the process)

Remember that the guy asking these questions went on to command the army which destroyed the temple. For some reason, I would think he had more important things on his mind...or not.

Anyway, if you ever have two hours on the subway, The Alphabet of Ben Sira and Rabbinic Fantasies are highly recommended.